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N the United States, we are not accustomed to consider the
theory of procedure as of profound importance. Possibly the
extraordinary technicality of American procedure by reason of
which substantive issues are so often relegated to practical ob-
livion by procedural tactics is in part responsible. At all events,
the unsystematic and empirical method of embarking upon and
concluding litigation seems to have developed a frame of mind
somewhat indifferent to the theoretical function of the judicial
process. For example, down to very recent days Justices of the
United States Supreme Court gave expression to the view, now
happily repudiated, that the award of execution was an essential
element of a judicial judgment.' Notwithstanding the fact that
judicial precedents and opinions have greater weight in the com-
plex structure of American law than they do in any other system
-utterances good, bad, and indifferent being seized upon with
equal avidity by an undiscriminating bar and bench - the fact is
that the theory of the judicial function and of judgments has been
largely neglected, in striking contrast with experience abroad.
Defective theory, in turn, impairs practice. It is submitted that
the inadequate analysis of such fundamental concepts as justicia-
bility, judicial power, and cause of action is largely responsible
for misconceptions prevailing in important circles concerning the
nature of judgments, and in particular of declaratory judgments.
The somewhat antiquated view of Blackstone that the " redress
of private injuries" is the sole function of courts of justice is
partly accountable for the erroneous view occasionally expressed
that the commission of wrong, public or private, is an essential
condition for invoking the judicial arm of the state.2 It is over-
1 See Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U. S. 70, 73 (1927). See repudia-
tion in Fidelity Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Swope, 274 U. S. 123, 132 (1927); Old
Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 279 U. S. 716, 725 (1929).
2 Thus SALmOND, JURiSPRUDENCE (7th ed. 1924) § 27, says: "Both in civil and
in criminal proceedings there is a wrong (actual or threatened) complained of. For
the law will not enforce a right except as against a person who has already violated
it, or who has at the least already shown an intention of doing so. justice is ad-
ministered only against wrongdoers, in act or intent." HOLLAND, ELEmENTS OF
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looked that the social equilibrium is equally disturbed when rights
of property or status are imperilled and made insecure by attack,
challenge, or uncertainty, and that equity in Anglo-American law
and common law or statute in other countries have long recognized
that fact and lent judicial aid to prevent or allay insecurity in
legal relations.
I
Wrongs as a legal conception. The view that wrongs condition
the right of action and judicial protection is superficial and, by the
too colloquial juxtaposition of "rights" and "wrongs," has given
a misleading scope to the conception of "wrongs," "threatened
wrongs," and judicial power. Some of the more critical students
of procedure have realized the error involved in assuming the
presence of " delict " or "wrong" in every cause of action.3  In
actions for partition, to declare a marriage void, to quiet title or
remove a cloud, to perpetuate testimony, and in innumerable
others, there is, as a rule, no delict at all.' The occasion of the
state's intervention is not a physical infringement of the plaintiff's
rights - the conception usually associated with delict or wrong
JuRISPR'UDENCE (I3th ed. 1924) 325: " When the balance of justice is disturbed by
wrong-doing, or even by a threat of it, the law intervenes to restore, as far as
possible, the status quo ante." (Italics supplied). MARBY, ELEMENTS OF LAW
(6th ed. 19o5) § 852: "It is a general rule that courts of law will not move unless
some duty or obligation is broken." (Italics supplied). POMEROY, CODE REmEDIS
(5th ed. 1929) § 347: "Every judicial action must therefore involve the following
elements: a primary right possessed by the plaintiff, and a corresponding primary
duty devolving upon the defendant; a delict or wrong done by the defendant which
consisted in a breach of such primary right and duty; a remedial right in favor of
the plaintiff, and a remedial duty resting on the defendant springing from this
delict, and finally the remedy or relief itself."
See other definitions quoted and cited in Clark, The Code Cause of Action (1924)
33 YALE: L. J. 817, 823 et seq.; McCaskill, Actions and Causes of Action (1925)
34 id. 614; ci. Reinhold, Ueber den Begriff einer Rechtsverletzung als Voraussetzung
des Klagerechts (1895) 21 ZEnscmurr nfx DEUTSCHEN CsrnROZESS 1, 6.
3 Clark, supra note 2, at 827; BLiss, CODE PLEADING (3d ed. 1894) § 113: "The
wrong may be done by the denial of a right; or by the refusal to respond to an
obligation; or it may arise from mere neglect in the performance of a duty; or it
may be an affirmative injury." (Italics supplied).
4 Clark, supra note 2, at 827, points out that to find a delict in such cases "forces
us to the absurdity suggested by Judge Bliss that the defendant's wrong is in refusing
a remedy to the plaintiff without action." BLISS, CODE PLEADING § 113, n.i; SIBLEY,
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- but the denial or dispute of his right, placing him in danger or
jeopardy and causing him detriment or prejudice,' under such cir-
cumstances that the plaintiff may properly invoke the court's
protection to re~stablish, safeguard, and declare his right, and
thus restore the social order.'
The loose and erroneous conception of the term "wrong" has
had its influence also in creating an unusual conception of the
word " threat" or "threatened wrong." The inference that some
physical damage must be imminent is indelibly associated with
the term. Possibly those who use it have had in mind the use
of the injunction and wish to indicate a strictly limited exception
from the alleged rule that the courts will act only when a" wrong"
has been committed - they therefore add " or threatened." Just
what Salmond meant by "wrongdoers in act or in intent " is not
easy to say. If the sense of imminence of injury, associated with
the remedy of injunction, were qualified, so that instead of
"threat" of injury we assume or posit a danger of injury, a dis-
pute or challenge of the plaintiff's right, we will come much closer
PHILs, CODE PLEAmNG (x896) § 31, n.2: "Primarily, an action is not ' for
the redress or prevention of a wrong'; it is a proceeding to protect a right. The
basis of every action is, a right in the plaintiff; and the purpose of the action is,
primarily, to preserve such right." (Italics supplied). The code cause of action,
by which the distinctions between legal and equitable actions are abolished, reads:
"The distinction between actions at law and suits in equity, and the forms of all
such actions and suits heretofore existing, are abolished; and there shall be in this
State hereafter but one form of action for the enforcement or protection of private
rights and the redress of private wrongs, which shall be denominated a civil action.
(Italics supplied). POmEROY, CODE REMEDI:ES (5th ed. 1929) 5; MARKBY, op. cit.
supra note 2, § 862: "The real object of many suits is not to compel redress, either
in the shape of compensation or in the shape of restitution. The real dispute is as
to the rights of the respective parties."
PosmRoY, EQUrrY JURISPRIOENCE (2d ed. 1892) § 1378, n.I: "In a suit to con-
strue a will, estates in specific property are directly established; in suits to quiet
title, the very object of the judgment is to declare and establish the plaintiff's legal
or equitable estate in some specific property. . . . Even in suits to remove a cloud
from title, although the relief is often obtained by means of a cancellation, yet from
the nature of the whole proceeding, the plaintiff's estate is thereby established, and
he is left in its full enjoyment." (Italics supplied). See also Gavit, The Code
Cause of Action: Joinder and Counter Claims (930) 30 COL. L. REv. 802, 803
et seq.
6 "The object of a developed system of law is the conservation, whether by
means of the tribunals or of permitted self-help, of the rights which it recognizes
as existing." HOLLAND, loc. cit. supra note 2. "The plaintiff comes into court seek-
ing judicial recognition of a substantive right." Gavit, supra note 5, at 8o5.
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to accuracy in stating the conditions of a right of action.' The
law has already recognized, and will increasingly recognize, that
the social equilibrium and security of acquisitions are disturbed
and endangered not only by an accomplished physical violation
of private rights, privileges, powers, or immunities, but by placing
these individual advantages in grave doubt and uncertainty. If the
status of children as legitimate or illegitimate, or of persons as mar-
ried or unmarried, or the title to property, is placed in uncertainty,
not only the individual concerned but also the state has an interest
in removing the uncertainty and settling the legal position. If the
privileges of a party to a contract or even of a party in non-
contractual relations are disputed; if the legal powers of the gov-
ernment or officials are challenged by the person affected, or if an
official or fiduciary is left in dilemma because of doubt and fear
of exercising powers which may expose him to personal liability,
not only the individual but the state has an interest in removing
the doubt before disaster has occurred. The state often does
remove it, provided the issue can be raised in justiciable form and
can be authoritatively settled. The need for security in legal re-
lations is elementary to order and progress in society, and courts
respond to this need by a variety of decrees consequent upon ap-
propriate actions. Courts of equity perform their primary func-
tion of creating security not by coercive decrees, but in removing
uncertainty by establishing and confirming existing rights without
necessarily attributing a wrong to anybody. For that reason, we
constantly find that the result of litigation is a mere declaration
of the rights of the parties. Far from constituting anything new,
it is one of the oldest functions of courts of equity.
The assertion of unfounded claims creating jeopardy is cause
for action. Apart from the remedy of injunction, and then often
theoretically only, no "threat " of wrongdoing or injury is re-
quired in these cases to set in motion the judicial machinery. The
existence of an instrument on the record, the utterance of a claim,
a physical act deemed legally unjustified, the existence of conflict-
ing claims to the same property, the danger of losing testimony -
7That no threat to violate plaintiff's rights is necessary, see Hopkinson v.
Mortimer, Harley & Co. Ltd., [1917] 1 Ch. 646. But the rights of the complaining
party must be in some danger of attack or challenge. Toronto Ry. v. City of
Toronto, 13 Ont. L. R. 532 (i9o6).
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these are the operative facts, the cause for action which authorizes
the plaintiff's "right of action." Where the mere enactment of
an ordinance or statute is complained of as causing damage, the
"threat" of imminent injury is often fictitious only, in order to
enable the court, through a bill of injunction, to establish and
determine the validity or invalidity of the legislation.8
The judicial function. The assumption that courts act only
after accomplished or threatened wrongdoing is probably respon-
sible for the frequent statement that the judicial power compels or
coerces (or penalizes) wrongdoers, "cures " wrongs, or, at most,
prevents their imminent commission. Hence also the assumption
that the execution or enforcement of a judgment is the essential
characteristic of judicial power.
The fact is, it is believed, that the court does not compel or
coerce, but decides, determines, establishes, and fixes legal rela-
tions between contesting parties. A judgment of a court is an
affirmation, by the authorized societal agent of the state, speaking
in the name of the law and the state, of the legal consequence
attending a proved or admitted state of facts.9 It is the deter-
mination or sentence of the law that a legal relation does or does
not exist."0 The power to render judgments, the so-called "ju-
dicial power," is the power to adjudicate upon contested or adverse
legal rights or claims, to interpret the law, and to declare what
8 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 535 (1925) ; Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926). See, e.g., the recent suit of a Texas
county attorney to enjoin a farmer from violating the new Texas law curtailing
cotton acreage. The press reports that it is "a friendly test case" to be decided
promptly before the cotton planting season starts in February. N. Y. World-
Telegram, Jan. 14, 1932. The proceeding indicates the misuse of injunction to obtain
a declaratory judgment which should, however, be conditioned upon proof of a
genuine controversy.
9 See i BLACK, A TREATIsE ON TnE LAW OF JUDGMENTS (189i) s; KIsCH,
BErrRXGE ZsUR URTEiLSLEHR. (1903) 6 et seq.; LANGHEInEKER, DER URTEIsAw-
SPRUCH (1899) §§ 9-12.
10 Danner v. Walker-Smith Co., 154 S. W. 295, 298 (Tex. Civ. App. 19X2);
i BLAcK:, op. cit. supra note 9, at 2; HOLLAND, op. cit. supra note 2, at 363.
"A judgment upon an issue of pecuniary liability performs its main function
when it adjudicates the existence or nonexistence of the liability sought to be estab-
lished." Symons v. Eichelberger, rio Ohio St. 224, 236, i44 N. E. 279, 282 (1924).
A convincing exposition of the fact that courts neither create nor enforce rights, but
by their judgments certify the fact that rights existed theretofore, merely converting
a right theretofore unenforceable into one now enforceable, will be found in Gavit,
supra note 5, at 807. Cf. ZumsTnm, DiE FEsTSTELLUNGSKLAOE (1916) 5, 13.
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the law is or has been.1 It is the final determination of the rights
of the parties in an action 12 which distinguishes the judgment
from all other public procedural devices to give effect to legal
rights. By so doing, it necessarily confers upon the successful
party certain powers and privileges, its recording gives an official
certification to a preexisting legal relation (or establishes a new
one on preexisting grounds)," and it affords authoritative pro-
tection and guaranty to challenged, endangered, or contested
rights. But it can not be emphasized too strongly that the execu-
tion of a judgment is a matter independent of the judicial deter-
mination and even of the order of the court, and that the enforce-
ment of the order upon the defendant to do or not to do something,
if not voluntarily performed, is left to the executive officials of
the state, and not to the court itself. The court's function is
completely performed by determining and deciding the case in a
form binding upon the parties; and it is the judgment, and not
the execution, which establishes their rights and constitutes the
essence of judicial power. 4 A judgment, as Mr. Black points
out,' 5 has in general "nothing whatever to do with the means of
enforcing the liability which it declares." Its declaratory, de-
terminative, and adjudicatory function is its distinctive charac-
teristic.
The coercion or compulsion exerted by a judgment, while essen-
'I ANDREW, LAW DICTIONARY 79, citing cases. See quotations assembled in
Miller v. Miller, i49 Tenn. 463, 480, 261 S. W. 965, 970 (1924).
12 Conradt v. Lepper, i3 Wyo. 99, 78 Pac. i, 2 (1904); (917) I5 R. C. L. 569,
citing cases.
13 "' Its [a judgment's] rendition is the judicial act by which the court settles
and declares the decision of the law upon the matter at issue. Its entry is the min-
isterial act by which enduring evidence of the judicial act is afforded.'" Moore v.
Toyah Valley Irr. Co., 179 S. W. 550, 552 (Tex. Civ. App. i915).
14 " When adverse litigants are present in court and there is a real controversy
between them, a final decision rendered in any form of proceeding of which the
court has jurisdiction is a judgment . . . and the giving of it is a judicial function,
whether or not execution may follow thereon." Kariher's Petition, 284 Pa. 455,
469, 131 Atl. 265, 270 (1925); cf. Fowler v. Fowler, 6i Okla. 280, 283, i6i Pac. 227,
230 (,917). "The judgment does not enforce the right; it merely enables it to be
enforced by the executive." Gavit, supra note 5, at 808.
15 Op. cit. supra note 9, at 4. Mr. Black adds: " Certain consequences do indeed
flow from it, -as the right to issue execution, the attaching of a lien upon land, -
but these are no part of the judgment, nor is it concerned with directions for making
its sanctions effective. It is, as already stated, a bare assertion."
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tial to its effectiveness, is not due to a coercive order to act or
refrain, but to the very existence of the judgment, as a determina-
tion of legal rights. Many judgments are incapable of, and do
not require, physical execution. They irrevocably fix, however,
a legal relation or status placed in issue, and that is all that the
judgment is expected to do. It is this determination which makes
it res judicata.
But most judgments do, in fact, command or order the defend-
ant to do or refrain from doing something, and it is this command
or order which has attracted undue attention as if it were the
essential ingredient of judicial power. It is out of this common
feature of judgments that the notion developed that, unless the
coercive arm or compulsion of the court were invoked, there was
no case for the exercise of judicial power. The determination, not
the command, is the essence of judicial power; and in our civilized
communities it is the determination, and not the command, which
evokes respect, because it is the determination of the societal
agent appointed to perform that function, and thus irrevocably
to fix legal relations.
Up to the middle of the nineteenth century, when the action for
a declaration of rights and the resulting declaratory judgment was
adopted in the statutes and judicial procedure of many countries,
it had been superficially assumed that the sole purpose of an
action was to compel the defendant to do or refrain from doing
something. A closer examination of the end and aim of a judg-
ment disclosed that, even in the absence of statutory authority,
courts, especially courts of equity, had for generations been ren-
dering judgments which conclusively determined the rights of
the parties, in which execution was not demanded or required and
for which execution was indeed impossible. These included par-
ticularly the determination of status, the determination of rights
to property, real or personal, the establishment of certain disputed
facts, the construction of written instruments. On the Continent,
this discovery and the official authorization of declaratory actions
and judgments induced a renewed study of the theory of actions
and judgments. A variety of classifications of judgments has
thereupon been suggested. Instead of subsuming declaratory and
executory judgments under the single rubric of judgments deter-
mining or declaring a preexisting legal relation, as does Kisch,
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several authorities, regarding the purpose to be served by the
judgment as the criterion of division, distinguish (a) the executory
judgment - the most common - and (b) the declaratory judg-
ment." Others, and perhaps the great majority, add to these a
third group (c), the constitutive or investitive judgment,17 which
creates a new legal relation. Others still add a fourth class (d),
the temporary injunction, 8 which might, however, be deemed
interlocutory or possibly procedural in character. These judg-
ments accomplish different purposes and afford varying forms of
relief, usually optional with the plaintiff.
Procedure. Procedure is the method established by law for
the vindication of the rights of person or property accorded by
substantive law.
Under the old common law as under the Roman law, the exist-
ence of a cause of action and of the right of action was determined
by its recognition and identification in an established procedural
writ. The existence of the remedy determined the existence of
the right. But even the flexibility of a chancellor or praetor in ex-
tending the scope of writs and actios could not meet the demands
of an advancing civilization, so that the complicated legal relations
embodied in an expanding substantive law gradually won their
independence from procedural criteria. 9 Procedure became rec-
16 See the citations to Ott, Pl6sz, Degenkolb and others, in ZUMsTEN, op. cit.
supra note 1o, at 20.
17 This Benthamism, whose use may be pardoned, seems more descriptive than
the term "titles of right" employed by SALmOND, op. cit. supra note 2, at 9i. The
term "right" here is too uncertain in connotation. The Germans call these judg-
ments "constitutive." Perhaps a more accurate nomenclature might use the term
"divestitive" for those judgments, like the annulment of a voidable marriage or
dissolution of partnership, which merely terminate an existing status. See Balog,
Ober das konstitutive Urteil (1907) 34 ZEITScHRa=T FR DAS PRIVAT UND OTFENT-
LICEE REcHT DER GEGENWART 123-68; H61der, Ueber des Klagrecht (1904) 46
JHERING'S JARBUiCHER 265, 282, 3o6; Helman, Klagrecht, Feststellungsklage und
Anspruch (1892) 31 id. 79, 9o, I4; HELLIVIG, SYSTEM DES DEUTSCHEN Z=vm-
PROZESSRECHTS (1912) 287; I WAcH, HANDBUCH DES DEUTSCaEN ZIVILPROZESS-
R.FCHS (1885) 11-12.
18 STEm (with GAuPp), ZIV.PROZESSORDNIUmN (i4th ed. 1928-29) Introduction
to § 253.
19 The Roman conceptions of the relation between procedure and substantive
law lasted well into the Middle Ages and were not effectively dissipated in Europe
until the nineteenth century. Windscheid was the pioneer of emancipation: DIE
ACTIO DES R6MfISC HEN ZIVILRECHTS, VOM STANDPUNKTE DES HEUTIGEN RECHTS
(1856). But the recognition of the Roman error did not become general until
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ognized in all modern systems as a method provided by the state
for the assurance, guaranty, and vindication of substantive rights,
so that in every private action there are two claims - one against
the defendant based on the rules of private law, the other against
the state (the courts) for the official confirmation or recognition
of the disputed right.20
The purpose of procedure is thus to bring about the public
guaranty of the reign of law and the private vindication of legal
rights. It is an essential instrument of social peace.
In all modern systems, there are certain conditions and pre-
requisites for successfully invoking the courts' protection in order
officially to confirm and certify private rights, disputed or en-
dangered. These conditions and prerequisites are partly proce-
dural, partly substantive in character. Among the former are
(a) the jurisdiction of the court over parties and subject matter,
(b) the capacity of the parties to sue and be sued, and (c) the
employment of the proper forms for instituting and conducting
the action. The lack of any of these requisites disables the court
from even considering the case. Among the latter are (a) the
soundness and validity of the complaint or cause of action under
the rules of substantive law; (b) the subject matter of the com-
plaint must be capable of legal protection, for example, it would
exclude passing upon a wager or an intellectual difference of
opinion not affecting rights of person or property; and (c) the
party seeking legal protection (plaintiff or defendant) must have a
sufficient legal interest to invoke the judicial process in his behalf.
Of these last three, all of which are essential to every action,
the first is factual, the second and third legal in character. The
right of action thus arises out of operative facts to which the law
attaches legal consequences. The legal interest of the plaintiff is
after Wach's celebrated monograph, DER FESTSTELLUNGSANSPRUCH: EIN BEITRAG
zuR LEHRE vom RECHTSSCi-uTZANSPRUCr (1889). Although now almost uni-
versal (see the authorities on civil procedure listed by ZuMsTEM, op. cit. supra
note io, at i6), the older conceptions still dominate certain publicists who maintain
that the function of procedure is the creation of concrete private rights. See
Bilow, Klage und Urteil (i9o3) 31 ZErrSCHR1Fr FUR DEUTSCIEEN CIVLRPOZESS
i9i, 256; cf. Clark, Ancient Writs and Modern Causes of Action (1925) 34 YaE
L. J. 879; Gavit, supra note 5, at 812.
20 DEGENKoLB, EINLASSUNGszVANG UND "URTEILSNORM (1877) 1, 9, 26, 32;
PomE~oy, op. cit. supra note 2, § o: Smamr, op. cit. supra note 4, at 14.
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required throughout the proceeding; the other prerequisites fnust
be established only at the beginning of the action. The defendant
is equally entitled to judicial protection, under similar conditions.
He has a right as against the state to have the complaint dismissed,
by reason of the absence of any of the necessary conditions of the
plaintiff's right of action or by reason of adequate affirmative de-
fenses. Theoretically, if the facts are undisputed, the court's
judgment ought to be predictable.
But the law or court has no concern with the motive of the plain-
tiff for bringing the action. It may be the desire for protection,
relief, freedom, security, compensation, or revenge and it may be
induced by doubts or fears, emanating from himself or others.
The fear of loss or jeopardy and the desire to avoid and escape it
are common motives of action. But to confuse the motives for
bringing an action with the legal prerequisites of an action is
unjustifiable error.
Judicial protection varies in kind, form, and purpose. The
action or proceeding may look to an interlocutory order of attach-
ment, designed to insure execution of a judgment, an order which
has prerequisites of its own. It may look to a judgment declaring
the rights - preexisting or newly established - of the parties, for
example, with respect to status or property. It may look to the
execution of a judgment, by securing money damages or specific
performance or an injunction. The demand for judicial protec-
tion may possibly seek other objectives.
The cause of action. Much has been written on the nature of
the cause of action, especially since the adoption of the codes of
procedure which have abolished the distinction between actions
at law and in equity. A great variety of definitions has been pro-
posed, some narrow and rigid, some broad and flexible.2 One
21 Clark, The Code Cause of Action (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 817, 824; Clark,
Ancient Writs and Modern Causes of Action (1925) 34 id. 879; Gavit, supra
note 5; Harris, What is a Cause of Action? (1928) z6 CAIF. L. REV. 459;
McCaskill, Actions and Causes of Action (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 614; and the
older writers, such as BLss, CODE PLEADING (3d ed. 1894) § 113; PHI LrPS, CODE
PLEADING (1896) § 31; POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES (4th ed. 1904) § 347; SIBLEY,
THE RIGHT TO, AND CAUSE FOR, ACrION (1902) 32 et seq. See, especially, CLARK,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING (1928) 75 et seq. See also the follow-
ing: BLEY, KLAGRECHT U1ND RECHTLICRES INTERESSE (1925) CC. 3, 5; HELLWIG,
ANSPRUCH UND KLAGRECHT (Igio); LANGHEINEKER, op. cit. supra note 9, § 4;
PL6sz, BErXGE zu THEoR- DES KLAGRECHTs (i88o) cC. I, 2.
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writer suggests that the concept can better be described than de-
fined.22 The commentators differ on the question whether the
cause of action, the ground upon which the judicial arm can be
successfully invoked, consists in the defendant's "wrong," in the
combination of the plaintiff's "primary right" and the defend-
ant's "delict," in the nature of the relief or remedy sought and
obtainable, in the right to sue, or in the aggregate of facts giving
ground or occasion to the courts to afford judicial relief. 3
While it is probable that every plaintiff seeks by his action a
judicial declaration of his right (in the broad sense) and of the
defendant's corresponding duty, it has already been observed that
the defendant's" wrong "or" delict "is not an essential element of
numerous actions. It may also be added that, while the protection
or vindication of private rights is the raison d'tre of procedure
and of the remedies sought by its use, the concept of "primary
right" is not so clear as it might seem, or that it is the cause of
action which gives occasion to the right of action - the privilege
to invoke judicial protection for the recognition, and hence en-
forcement, of existing rights. It seems preferable to adopt the
conception of Dean Clark that the cause of action consists in that
aggregate of operative facts (including the defendant's conduct)
affording ground or occasion to obtain or secure judicial relief of
some kind.2" This definition is flexible enough to accommodate
new substantive rights (and hence relief) which may be granted
or recognized by the lawmaking authorities. 25  But while the
willingness of the courts to grant some relief may be the criterion
of the right of action,26 a matter of procedure, and hence of the
22 Harris, supra note 21.
22 A criticism of some or all of these views will be found in the articles cited
in note 21, supra.
24 CODE PLADING 83; Clark, The Code Case of Action (1924) 33 YALE L. J.
817, 829.
25 Among these law-making authorities in practice if not in theory are the
courts, who, under changing conditions of economic and social relations, occa-
sionally recognize and give effect to new rights, especially in the law of torts.
This does not militate against the truth of the general theory that courts neither
create nor enforce rights- they recognize them and thus give them official sanc-
tion, making enforceable what prior thereto was not enforceable.
26 One must not misuse this term to embrace the "right" or privilege to com-
mence an action, with or without cause, of which anyone may avail himself if he
pays the court fees. The term means a right to sue on a claim recognized by the
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existence of a cause for action, a matter of substantive law, it
can not be too strongly emphasized that the nature of the relief
granted, or even the nature of the prayer for relief, has nothing
to do with the question of the existence of the cause of action."
The same group of operative facts may give rise to different reme-
dies- damages, an injunction, specific performance, a declara-
tory judgment of the rights of the parties - and actions are often
described by the remedy or relief they thus seek. Each of these
constitutes a form of relief, optional as a rule with the plaintiff;
and the selection of one or the other, or of one or more simultane-
ously, in no way affects the existence of the cause of action.2"
Whether one or another of these remedies shall be granted is
often a matter of judicial policy, generally guided by precedents;
but that the grant of any one of them would necessarily presup-
pose a cause of action can hardly be doubted.29
A question has, however, been raised whether the action for a
negative declaration, to the effect that the defendant has no valid
claim or right against the plaintiff, does not constitute a demand
for a judgment that the defendant has no cause of action against
the plaintiff rather than an affirmation that the plaintiff has a
courts as valid under substantive law. Cf. HE.Lwio, KLAGRECHT -UND KLAG-
MoGLIcH EIT (1905) 25 et seq.
27 Pomeroy, Bliss, Phillips, and Clark eliminate the element of relief sought
or obtained as a factor in determining the scope of the cause of action. McCaskill
and Harris consider it important. Clark, supra note 2, at 829; Harris, supra
note 21, at 466. The difference lies possibly in the failure to distinguish between
the existence of relief and the nature of the relief, the former only constituting a
factor in the cause of action.
28 " Since the demand for relief does not constitute a part of the cause of
action, as from the same cause of action there often arise several remedial rights,
the singleness of a cause of action cannot be determined by an examination of
whether different kinds of relief are prayed for or objects sought." (i9o6) 23
Cyc. 283.
29 It will later be observed that the policy of courts in various parts of the
world varies materially in the matter of issuing declaratory judgments-some
making it conditional upon the possibility of also obtaining executory or so-called
coercive relief (a decree specifically commanding the defendant) (England, before
1873), some making it conditional upon the impossibility of obtaining executoryk
relief (India, and Germany, formerly), some being indifferent to such possibilities
(England and the United States), and some considering it a matter of ad hoc
policy in each case. Cf. Russian Commercial & Industrial Bank v. British Bank
for Foreign Trade Ltd., [1921] 2 A. C. 438; Gray v. Spyer, [1921] 2 Ch. 549.
In the same country, as has happened in England and in Germany, the policy
may change at different periods.
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cause of action against the defendant."0 Inasmuch as by such an
action for a negative declaration the plaintiff obtains the relief "'
or remedy that he requires, it is not apparent why the court is not
implicitly recognizing in the plaintiff a right to be free or an immu-
nity from the defendant's power to sue; and while such a declara-
tion would be issued under unusual circumstances only, it does
establish a cause and hence a right of action in the plaintiff.
While in these cases no wrong has yet been committed or immedi-
ately threatened, a condition of affairs is disclosed which indicates
the existence of a cloud upon the plaintiff's rights, a cloud which
80 Guaranty Trust Co. v. Hannay & Co., [1915] 2 K. B. 536. This case,
which will be referred to again, was brought by the Guaranty Trust Co. in Eng-
land asking for a declaration that they were not under a duty to repay to
Hannay & Co. certain moneys that Hannay & Co. had paid on forged bills of
lading and attached bills of exchange. It was brought under Order XXV, rule 5,
of the Supreme Court Rules of x883, providing that "No action or proceeding
shall be open to objection on the ground that a merely declaratory judgment or
order is sought thereby, and the Court may make binding declarations of right
whether any consequential relief is or could be claimed or not." The trust com-
pany wished the declaration in order to get an authoritative determination of the
English law for use in an American court and to stop vexatious proceedings
brought against them in the United States by Hannay. The majority of the
court, Pickford and Bankes, L. JJ., thought the declaration might be issued,
though they argued that the " legal " "cause of action" in "the proper sense"
was in the defendant and not in the plaintiff, and hence raised the inference that
a plaintiff suing for a negative declaration need not allege a "cause of action" in
himself. So the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania suggested that a " cause of ac-
tion is not essential to the assumption of jurisdiction in this form of procedure."
Kariher's Petition, 284 Pa. 455, 458, 131 AtI. 265, 268 (1925). This seems er-
roneous. The conception "cause of action" is too narrowly construed. In dis-
pensing with the necessity for consequential (coercive) relief, the English Court
of Appeal was merely giving effect to Order XXV, rule 5. Even though that
Order itself speaks of "action or proceeding," it is questionable whether the court
was not implicitly recognizing in the (equitable) plaintiff a new (not the tradi-
tional) independent cause of action arising out of the assertion by the defendant
of allegedly unfounded claims, and hence a right of action to have the defendant's
claims declared void. On the other hand, if "cause of action" is understood only
in its traditional, though not accurate, sense, which presupposed some, form of
coercive relief or command, and if this is deemed essential to the issuance of a
declaratory judgment (Viola School District v. Canada Saskatchewan Land Co.,
3 Sask. L. 498, 499 (2go), following Offin v. Rochford, [igo6] i Ch. 342), the
negative declaratory action is practically wiped out and made impossible. War-
rington, J., who decided Offin v. Rochford, overruled his own views then ex-
pressed in Burghes v. Attorney General, [1911 ] 2 Ch. '39; cf. Guaranty Trust
Co. v. Hannay & Co., [1915] 2 K. B. 536, 56I; STrLZER, Dv, NEGATIV FnSTSTL-
LUNGSKLAGE (I9M3) (Diss.) 16 et seq.; ZumsTmN, op. cit. supra note zo, at zS-i6.
31 See the types of cases discussed in this article.
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endangers his peace of mind, his freedom, his pecuniary interests.
This is a tangible interest which the law protects against impair-
ment, and by protecting it promotes social peace. The plaintiff
asserts his privilege and immunity from the defendant's claim or
potential claim and power - that he is not bound or liable in the
manner defendant asserts. Substantive law recognizes his privi-
lege and immunity, and procedure affords him an opportunity to
vindicate his rights. So long as the courts recognize in the plain-
tiff an interest for which they will afford him protection by means
of an action and a resulting judgment, they necessarily admit that
he has a "cause " of action and a " right " of action. The ex-
pansion in the forms of equitable relief evidenced the fact that
new interests were taken under the protection of the law and that
old interests received a protection they did not theretofore enjoy.
The action for a so-cailed negative declaration is simply a broad-
ening of the equitable action for the removal of a cloud from title
to cover the removal of clouds from legal relations generally,
under circumstances where the courts believe a useful purpose is
thereby served. When the issue is clearly a contested one in-
volving legal interests, it seems immaterial whether the legal or the
equitable plaintiff (prospective defendant) starts the action.
Moreover, the plaintiff can express his claim with equal facility
in an affirmative concept, instead of a negative -instead of
asserting that he is under no duty, he asserts privilege; instead of
asserting that he is not liable, he asserts immunity; or he can urge
the defendant's duty not to claim (or no-right) or the defendant's
disability. The importance of the power to sue on the part of an
endangered or potentially endangered or disputed possessor of
rights is that judicial protection may be obtained before the danger
has ripened into catastrophe and before the other party has com-
menced suit to enforce his claims. The mere assertion of the claim
may do the plaintiff material harm and entitle him to a judgment
establishing the legal truth. Security and certainty in legal rela-
tions is a matter of public as well as private interest.
II
The following examples drawn from practice in the United
States and elsewhere indicate the types of legal interests that are
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protected by the declaratory judgment, enabling a plaintiff moved
by doubt and uncertainty in his legal relations to avoid the result-
ing peril and insecurity by obtaining an authoritative adjudication
of his rights, before risking disaster either by acting on his own
guess concerning his rights or by not acting because of fear of
consequences. The necessity for acting at one's peril should be
limited so far as conveniently possible. Citizen and community
thereby avoid the danger and disadvantage of irretrievable loss,
as well as prejudicial suspense and dilemma.
While by no means the only function of the declaratory judg-
ment, one of its major purposes is to afford relief from uncertainty
and insecurity. " The New York Court of Appeals has remarked
that " the general purpose of the declaratory judgment is to serve
some practical end in quieting or stabilizing an uncertain or dis-
puted jural relation either as to present or prospective obliga-
tions." 8 This function was picturesquely described some years
ago by Congressman Gilbert of Kentucky: "Under the present
law you take a step in the dark and then turn on the light to see
if you stepped into a hole. Under the declaratory judgment law
you turn on the light and then take the step." "
The effort to avoid a threatened or impending danger or risk
may involve contractual or non-contractual legal relations.
Equity is already familiar with numerous types of actions in
which the aid of a court is sought and given to remove, by mere
declaration, a cloud from the title and to quiet the title to prop-
erty. The practice of instituting an action for a declaratory judg-
ment has identical purposes in a wider field by quieting challenged
and doubtful rights with respect to property or other relations,
32 See Kan. Acts 1921, C. 168, § 6, REv. STAT. ANN. (1923) 60-3132. "Its
purpose is to afford relief from the uncertainty and insecurity attendant upon
controversies over legal rights, without requiring one of the parties so to invade
the rights asserted by the other as to entitle him to maintain an ordinary action
therefor." See also Ky. Laws 1922, c. 83, CODES (Carroll, 1927) § 639a-xo, and
declaratory judgment statutes in other states.
33 James v. Alderton Dock Yards, Ltd., 256 N. Y. 298, 176 N. E. 401 (1931).
Chief Judge Cardozo has said: "I have been impressed on numerous occasions
with the belief that it has supplied a useful expedient to litigants who would
otherwise have acted at their peril, or at best would have been exposed lo har-
rowing delay." Letter, April 20, 1928, Hearings, United States Senate, on H. R.
5623, to amend the Judicial Code, April 27, 1928, p. 55.
34 69 CONG. RFc. 2108 (1928).
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so as to enable business and transactions to proceed with security
and without peril. The dispute between the parties as to their
respective rights having arisen, the disquieted, threatened, or chal-
lenged party, instead of acting first on his own view of his legal
right -thereby destroying an established relation and economic
fabric - institutes against the adverse party an action, by com-
plaint or, in England, by originating summons, asking for a
declaratory judgment in the plaintiff's favor that he is privileged
to enjoy the right he claims or to undertake the action he proposes,
and that the defendant has no right to interfere. The issue is
the same as it would be if the act had been done or the alleged
right exercised first, but much social and economic damage is
avoided by bringing the suit before doing the act. Naturally, the
court is careful to verify the fact that the controversy is a real
and genuine one, that the parties have an active and immediate
interest in its determination, and that the judgment of the court
will finally decide and end the controversy.
While the types of cases which have been presented to the
courts are innumerable, there are certain among them which have
occurred with sufficient frequency to warrant special attention.
Those which arise out of contracts are perhaps the most numerous;
the action for a declaratory judgment in these cases serves, as a
rule, to avoid, on the plaintiff's part, a breach of contract and the
resulting damages, apart from other effects of acting mistakenly
and rashly on his own view of his rights.
Contested Contractual Privileges
It frequently happens that a party to a contract contends that he
is privileged to act in certain ways under the contract, and is about
to do so when his right is challenged, either by another party to the
contract or by a third person in interest. The challenge or denial
of his claimed privilege constitutes a cloud upon his right to act.
Ie may (i) desist from the proposed act, (2) undertake it not-
withstanding the adverse claim, or (3) he may seek to remove
the cloud before acting by suing for a declaration of his privilege
to act as proposed or of the no-right of the defendant to inter-
fere with, deny, or challenge him. If he undertakes the proposed
act without testing the validity of the challenge, both he and the
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other parties to the proposed transaction run the risk of breaking
contracts, or committing torts, or violating statutes, to the general
detriment of all concerned. The sensible procedure, therefore, is
for the plaintiff, about to exercise his claimed and challenged
privilege, to summon the adverse parties into court as defendants
and ask a declaration of his privilege to undertake the act pro-
posed. For the court, this usually involves merely a construction
or interpretation of the contract. By a determination of the issue
the plaintiff is then certain of his right and can act accordingly,
while having avoided the risks of damages, forfeiture, or other un-
toward consequence which his mistaken action would have en-
failed. Or instead of waiting to be sued on the contractual claim
of another, he may, as equitable plaintiff, ask a declaration that
the defendant has no claim against him, so that he may thus
breathe freely again. This was the substance of the celebrated
case of Guaranty Trust Co. v. Hannay & Co. 5
Among the more interesting cases of this type are those in which
some third person claims that the contracting party is barred from
proceeding as he proposes, and thus, hanging to his coat tails, cre-
ates doubt and uncertainty for the contractor. To get rid of the
challenge, the contractor sues the challenger' or the other party to
the contract, for a declaration of his privilege to act as he proposes.
'thus, a prospective vendor may claimthe privilege of making a
sale and conveying a good title, without seeking the consent of
some challenging legatee, or public authority, or other party claim-
ing an interest. 6 Trustees and fiduciaries of all kinds frequently
-5 [191] 2 K.-B. 536.
36 Mendel v. Congregation Adath Israel, 213 Ky. 371, 281 S. W. 163 (1926)
(congregation seeks declaration of its power to convey cemetery to city for park
purposes, notwithstanding defendant's objection to removal of remains of her
grandfather. - Defendant's rights not passed on, only power to convey upheld). Or,
seeking to escape the duty to convey, he may claim that he is not required to com-
plete the sale, without the mortgagee's consent, as defendant asserted. Dillon v.
Hills, 29 N. Z. 355 (39o9); Petroleum Exploration, Inc. v. Superior Oil Corp., 232'
Ky. 635, 24 S, W:(2d) 259 (1930) (privilege of selling assets in Kentucky, without
consent of three-quarters of its shareholders. Proposed purchaser defendant-
doubted); In re Wm. Thomas & Co., Ltd., Thomas v. Sully, [I915] x Ch. 325
(that plaintiff corporation privileged to sell part of its business, free from adverse
claims of shareholders) ; In re Hone & Parker's Contract, [1922] 2 Ch. 424 (vendor
seeks declaration that consent to sale, as claimed by purchaser, was not necessary) ;
North.British Ry. v. Birrell's Trustees, ['gi8] Sess. Cas. 33, 47 (plaintiff obtained
a declaration that defendant had no right to object to plaintiff's leasing certain
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make use of the declaratory judgment to obtain a determination of
thieir privilege to sell, mortgage, or in other ways to deal with the
trust property, notwithstanding the challenge, and free from the
claim of an adverse party.
:An interesting instance of an effort to secure, in advance of
hazardous refusal to perform, an interpretation of a contractual
obligation, occurred in Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Glennie" The
president of the Falls Equipment Co., having been injured in a'
company automobile and having sued the company for damages
after refusal of compensation because he was not an employee
requested the plaintiff insurance company to defend the action
under the insurance policy. Thereupon the insurance company
brought an action for a declaration that they were under no duty
to cletend under the policy, inasmuch as the president was not an
employee. Such a declaration, if granted, would have clarified
the legal position for all concerned, the injured president, the com-,
panv. and the insurer. The declaration was denied on the merits,
because, under the policy, the liability of the insurer was deemed
to be increased if an officer was injured.
.Not widely different is a striking action brought by the receiver'
o1 an insured insolvent tortfeasor railroad against an insurer who
disclaimed liability under the policy on the ground that it was not
liable until the insured railroad had paid at least $2 5,000 on judg-
ihents against it." The railroad had been sued for negligence
in several actions, and thus far had'suffered a judgment of only
$7,500; but four other negligence actions were pending which.
might easily carry the liability over the $25,000 limit. The re-
ceiver sought a declaration that the insurer would be liable for
amounts in excess of $25,ooo, notwithstanding the fact that the
r.ailroad was unable'to pay the first $25,0oo in judgments. In
quoting from an earlier opinion that "the most fruitful field for
the use- of this form of relief is in the construction of written
instruments," the court said:
"It Would be difficult to think of a situation wherein the purpose
behind section 473' of the Civil Practice Act could find better vindication
lands. Speaking of this negative declaration, Lord Dunedin said: "One great merit
of the Scottish action of declarator is its elasticity").
37 i32 Misc. 899, 23c N. Y. Supp. 673 (1928).
38 Post v. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co., 227 App. Div. x56, 237 N. Y. Supp. 64
(1929), aff'd, 254 N. Y. 541, 373 N.'E. 857-(193o).
JUDICIAL RELIEF FOR PERIL AND INSECURITY 81'
than the very situation we have here. One plaintiff has already re-
covered $7,5oo. There are left four negligence actions yet to be tried,
to be followed, if the plaintiffs succeed in recovering over $17,500, in
the aggregate, by four actions against this defendant pursuant to section
iog of the Insurance Law. At least one of these latter four actions
will have to be tried as a test case. That makes five actions to be tried,
four of which are of a kind that requires days to try. None of them
need be, or likely will be, tried if defendant is vindicated in its claim
as to the construction to be given the policy, and this issue is so nar-
row it can be tried in a few minutes." s1
Several claims of contractors, subcontractors, sureties, and
others having been made upon a town and property owners, aris-
ing out of improvements which had to be paid for by bonds
serviced by taxation, the town, uncertain of its obligations, brought
an action - on its own and on certain property owners' behalf -
against the several claimants in order that it might have its lia-
bility determined, levy the necessary taxes, and issue appropriate
bonds. Said Judge Rodenbeck: "It seems proper . . .under
this practice to determine in this form of action which one of the
plaintiffs is liable, if at all, and the extent of such liability, and the
rights and liabilities of the defendants among themselves, so that
the total expense of the improvement may be determined, the
assessment levied, and the bonds issued." 40
In a case in Germany, a former partner who had agreed not to
engage in a competing business for ten years, under a stipulated
penalty for breach, sought a declaration against his former part-
ners that he was privileged to work as an employee without paying
the penalty.,1
In all these cases it is the plaintiff's doubts or fears, and the
doubts or fears of others, as to the legality of the claim of privilege
or as to the consequences of the contemplated act, which give the
plaintiff that legal interest in a judicial determination which makes
the case justiciable.
Ss 227 App. Div. at i58-59, 237 N. Y. Supp. at 67.
40 Town of Greece v. Murray, 130 Misc. 55, 57, 223 N. Y. Supp. 6o6, 608
(1927). See a multipartite action in A. E. Joy Co. Inc. v. New Amsterdam Casualty
Co., 98 Conn. 794, 12o Atl. 684 (1923).
41 R. G. Z. 40, 97 (I897). He also sought a declaration that he was privileged
to establish, his own. business or become a partner in one by paying the stipulated
penalty.
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Although arising under the construction of a will, the action
of Brokaw v. Fairchild42 might as readily have arisen under a
deed. The plaintiff, a life tenant of an old-fashioned New York
residence, sued the remaindermen and trustee for a declaratory
judgment that he was privileged to demolish the building, which
had become outmoded in that neighborhood, and to erect an apart-
ment house which would pay an income for the benefit of all con-
cerned. The defendants contended that such demolition would
be waste, that the other members of the family had received resi-
dences in the neighborhood, and that it would spoil the plottage
Value of the property. In denying the declaration sought, the court
saved the plaintiff from the danger of acting on his own mistaken
view of his rights, and removed 'all uncertainty from the legal
position of all parties.
In numerous cases of construction of contracts, one party, be-
fore acting on his own interpretation of his disputed rights and
privileges, seeks the prior assurance of a judicial determination.
Among these are cases in which the plaintiff asserts that the con-
tract is not binding on him, and that he is privileged, therefore, to
do what he proposes,43 or that he is privileged to rescind or ter-
minate it by virtue of the defendant's alleged breach,44 or for other
reasons.45 The plaintiff thereby avoids the risk of first acting on
42 135 Misc. 70, 237 N. Y. Supp. 6 (1929).
43 Bacchus Marsh Concentrated Milk Co. v. Nathan, 26 C. L. R. 410 (1919)
(that defendant disabled from enforcing certain covenant against plaintiff, and that
plaintiff is privileged to do certain things) ; Steinberg v. Cohen, [1930] 2 D. L. R.
9i6 (that chattel mortgage by plaintiff to defendant is invalid) ; Mayor of Feilding
v. Feilding Gas Co., 3o N. Z. 298 (1911) (whether contract binding and whether
plaintiff privileged to establish separate lighting system).
44 Ufa Films, Inc. v. Ufa Eastern Division Distribution, Inc., 134 Misc. 129, 234
N. Y. Supp. 147 (1929) (plaintiff's share in contract with defendant was to be
,5% of moneys paid by exhibitors, subject to payment of advance royalties. Plain-.
tiff claimed that 5o% was in addition to royalties, which defendant denied. There-
upon plaintiff, claiming breach, threatened to terminate, but instead brings action
for declaration of privilege to terminate. Held, for defendant); Tattersall v.
Sladen, [1928] i Ch. 318 (that plaintiff was privileged to terminate bs" defendant's
omissions)-;--Rechtsprechung des Arbeitsrechts (Potthoff) i914-27, No. 967 (that-
defendant had given plaintiff grounds for termination of contract) ; Reichsarbeiter-
gericht, Dec. 18, 1929, Bensheimer VII, 512 (that contract of trade associations with
employees not binding on plaintiff).
45 Bell v. Scott, 30 C. L. R. 387 (1922) (plaintiff purchaser's privilege to rescind
for defective title); Toohey v. Gunther, 41 C. L. R. i81 (1928) (that defendant
vendor had no right to rescind and retain deposit, but that plaintiff vendee was so,
privileged).
JUDICIAL RELIEF FOR PERIL AND INSECURITY
his own assumption that he is not bound or is privileged to rescind
or terminate, only to find, perhaps, in a subsequent suit for
damages brought against him, that he was wrong.
. On the other hand, the plaintiff may sue for a declaration that
he has not defaulted, thus avoiding the threatened consequences
of an alleged breach.46
Specific privileges under a contract are frequently claimed be-
fore their exercise is attempted. If their exercise is sustained
as permissible under the contract, the plaintiff has the assurance
that he is not subject to damages or penalties for breach. If their
exercise is not sustained, the plaintiff has a warning of the conse-
quences that will follow breach and has avoided the penalties which
his ill-advised acts would have entailed. The dispute usually arises
out of a difference of interpretation or construction of the terms
of a contract, the open or potential breach of which is definitely
avoided by a suit on the disputed issue before, rather than after,
exercise of the claimed privilege. Apart from the penalties, for-
feitures, and sanctions thus averted, the economic fabric of the
contract itself has been saved from destruction, for after breach
and a suit for damages it is often impossible to patch again and
reinstate the sundered relations.
Thus, declarations have been sought that the plaintiff was privi-
leged to work as an employee, notwithstanding an agreement
against entering into competing business,47 to use a market free
from competition,48 to raise the price of admission under a lease
without the landlord's consent,4 9 to regulate the right of members
of an underwriter's association to charge fees and perform serv-
ices for outsiders,5" to change the terms of insurance policies,
thereby diminishing and altering the rights of old members of the
association, 5' to provide funds for unions other than the plaintiff
46 Bray v. Kuch, 28 N. Z. 667 (igog) (plaintiff denies default and defendant's
exercise of resulting powers).
47 R. G. Z. 40, 97 (,897). See also Wanek v. Thols, [1928] x D. L. R. 873,
2 id. 793 (that plaintiff is privileged to enter caveat against defendant's breach of
contract to refrain from competing business [W's business claimed to be R's]).
48 Morpeth Corp. v. Northumberland Farmers' Auction Mart Co., [1921] 2 Ch.
154.
49 In re Dott's Lease, Miller v. Dott, [1920] 1 Ch. 281.
50 Buffalo Ass'n of Fire Underwriters v. Noxsel-Dimick Co., 141 Misc. 333
( 930i.
.51 United Order of Foresters v. Miller, 178 Wis. 299, i9o N. W. 198 (1922)
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union,52 to make different restrictions to different purchasers of
land in the same development, 3 to remove buildings, 4 to retain
a ship until repair liens are paid,55 to inspect books of the defend-
ant union, of which plaintiff is a member,5" to repay a debt, free of
excessive interest.
57
On the other hand, the existence or validity of the plaintiff's
privileges may be brought to determination in the form of a demand
for a negative declaration that the defendant has no right to do
some particular act, diminishing or endangering the rights of the
plaintiff. This simply reverses the r6les of defendant and plain-
tiff, in that the prospective defendant anticipates his defense by
instituting the action as equitable plaintiff, asserting that the pro-
spective plaintiff, the equitable defendant, has no right to maintain
a claim or to do the act done, threatened, or proposed, which would
injure the plaintiff. Thus, he may claim that the defendant has
no right to demand money or salary,58 to reduce the plaintiff's
salary,55 to discharge the plaintiff from employment,6" to interfere
(plaintiff claims the members' rights are not vested). The obverse of this issue
occurred in Grainger v. Order of Canadian Home Circles, 31 Ont. L. R. 461 (1914),
33 Ont. L. R. ii6 (i915), where beneficiary, over 70, seeks declaration that by-law
changing his vested benefits is invalid. Declaration issued but injunction denied.
52 In re National Union of Seamen, [1929] i Ch. 216 (the defendants were
members of the union who claimed that the proposed act was ultra vires).
53 Bristol v. Woodward, 251 N. Y. 275, 167 N. E. 44i (1929).
54 Premier Dairies, Ltd. v. Garlick, [1920] 2 Ch. i7 (lessee claimed benefit of
special statutes). 55 The Countess, [1921] P. 279, [1922] P. 41.
56 Dodd v. Amalgamated Marine Workers' Union, [1923] 2 Ch. 236, [1924] I
Ch. ii6. 57 Kruse v. Seely, [1924] i Ch. 136.
58 Cloverdale Union High School Dist. v. Peters, 88 Cal. App. 731, 264 Pac. 273
(1928) (that defendant has no right to claim salary under alleged contract); Burgis
v. Constantine, [i9o8] 2 K. B. 484 (that defendants have no claim upon plaintiff's
shares of stock, arising out of alleged mortgage created by transferee for limited
purpose); Reichsarbeitergericht, March I, 193o, Bensheimer IX, R. A. G. 31 (that
defendant has no further claim against plaintiff, on account of reduced work);
Soergel, Jahrbuch des Verwaltungsr. IV, 653 (no-right to demand reimbursement
of costs of street).
59 Schedlich v. Commonwealth, 38 C. L. R. 518 (1926). In connection with
such salary problems, see also Meek v. Port of London Authority, [1918] 1 Ch. 415,
-[i918] 2 Ch. 96 (employer's duty to pay income tax). Employer may use the
declaratory judgment to establish the proper basis of computation of salary: S. J. &
E. Fellows, Ltd. v. Corker, [1918] i Ch. 9; Patent Castings Syndicate, Ltd. v.
Etherington, [i919] I Ch. 306, [1919] 2 Ch. 254.
60 R. G. 9i, 27 (9,7) (no right to discharge and plaintiff's right to future
payments of salary); Reichsarbeitergericht R. A. G. 99/29, Bensheimer VII, 162.
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with the plaintiff in the enjoyment of a franchise,6 to exclude the
plaintiff from drilling on defendant's land,62 to rescind a contract
of sale,63 or to take other action violative of the plaintiff's rights
under a- contract.64 In many of these cases injunction will not
lie, yet it is extremely important that the disputed claim be settled
and the plaintiff's rights quieted. In some of these contested
claims, the plaintiff demands stabilization or protection for rights
endangered by the defendant's claim, rather than escape from any
pending or potential liability.
Escape from Contractual Obligations
The hectic pace and rapidity of change in modern life have their
influence upon contracts by creating, through the events of nature
or statute, new conditions which the parties could-not have had in
contemplation. In long-term contracts the mere effect of the
passage of time is productive of changed conditions which alter
the effect or purpose of contractual obligations. Again, acts done
by one of the parties may be deemed by the other as effecting a
release from the obligation; or it may be claimed that conditions
alone justify release, either because the contract was originally
void or voidable or has since by circumstance become unenforce-
able. In all these cases it would be hazardous for the party claim-
ing release to act upon his own assumption of his rights, refuse
further to perform, and thereby invite an action for damages. In
61 Earl of Dysart v. Hammerton & Co., [1914] I Ch. 822.
62 Equitable Gas Co. v. Smith, 13 D. & C. 616 (Pa. 1929).
63 Buyer sues: Proctor v. Pugh, [1921] 2 Ch. 256 (seller's compliance with
statutes); In re Des Reaux and Setchfield's Contract, [1926] 1 Ch. 178 (seller's
notice of rescission void) ; Toohey v. Gunther, 41 C. L. R. i81 (1928) (seller had
not disclosed bond restricting scope of hotel's purchasing powers).
Seller sues: Hannan v. Wilson, xoi N. J. Eq. 743, 139 Atl. i65 (1927) (default);
In re Spencer and Hauser's Contract, [1928] I Ch. 598 (seller claimed sufficient
answer as to his representative status) ; Dillon v. Hills, 29 N. Z. 355 (i9o9) (ex-
change).
64 Piercy v. Louisville & Nashville R. R., x98 Ky. 477, 248 S. W. 1042 (1923) (to
shift plaintiff from day run to night run); Hillman v. Commonwealth, 35 C. L. R.'
260 (1924) (employee sues to establish that his hours of work should not exceed a
stated number per week without payment of overtime); Grainger v. Order of
Canadian Home Circles, 33 Ont. L. R. 116 (1915) (to change'by-laws of benefit
association to plaintiff's disadvantage); Brylinski v. Inkol, 55 Ont. L. R. 369 (1924)
(to change name and purposes of private society).
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the case of long-term contracts, such precipitate action might be A
disastrous gamble. To escape from such risks and their painful
consequences by obtaining an authoritative determination of one's
rights before acting is one of the principal functions of the action
for a declaratory judgment.
Such cases had a striking illustration during the World War.
English companies bound by long-term contracts to supply raw
materials to German firms sought by declaration to determine
whether they were still bound to supply the material after the War.
was over, that is, whether the War had merely suspended the obli-
gation or had terminated it. Upon the answer to that question
their plans for post-war business would to a considerable degree
be dependent. Parliament had assisted this judicial function by
providing in the Legal Proceedings against Enemies Act, 1915, that
a British subject or corporation might claim a declaration against
an enemy subject or corporation, provision being mad6 for substi-
tuted service, "as to the effect of the war on rights or liabilities
under a contract entered into before the war." The English courts
frequently held that the effect of the War was to terminate the
contract, whereupon the plaintiff knew that he was protected
against an action for breach and could thereupon make commer-
cial plans accordingly. 5
The effect of a statute is often to create new conditions which
materially alter the position of the parties to a contract and place
65 Contracts terminated by state of war: Ertel Bieber & Co. v. Rio Tinto Co.
Ltd., [x918] A. C. 260; Zinc Corp., Ltd. v. Hirsch, [1916] 1 K. B. 541; Distington
Hematite Iron Co. Ltd. v. Possehl & Co., [i916] E K. B. 811; Jager v. Tolme &
Runge & London Produce Clearing House, Ltd., [i916] 1 K. B. 939 (that the con-
tract incapable of performance by war embargo); Clapham S. S. Co. Ltd. v.-
Handels-En Transport-Maatschappij Vulcaan of Rotterdam, [1917] 2 K. B. 639;
Johnson v. Sargant & Sons, [1918] 1 K. B. ioz (subject matter of contract requisi-
tioned by controller); Central India Mining Co. Ltd. v. Soci&6 Coloniale Anversoise,
[1920] 1 K. B. 753; Orconera Iron Ore Co., Ltd. v. Fried-Krupp, Aktien-Gesell-
schaft, :i8 L. T. R. 237 (1918).
Partnership terminated by state of war: Hugh Stevenson & Sons, Ltd. v. Aktien-
gesellschaft fiir Cartonnagen-Industrie, [1918] A. C. 239 (partnership declared
terminated and right of German partners to share after the war in profits declared).
See also In re Continental C. & G. Rubber Co. Proprietary, Ltd., 27 C. L. R. z94
(igig) (effect of war on contracts shown in claims on winding up under Trading
with the Enemy Acts) ; Leipziger Ztsch. 19, 482, Soergel, 1919, p. 233 (that
plaintiff's obligation to deliver after the war is extinguished by complete change of
conditions).
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'them in doubt and uncertainty as to their legal relations. A notable
case of this kind occurred in Pennsylvania. The plaintiff trust
company had in February, 1923, leased to defendant P, who sub-
leased to defendant motor company, a three-story, non-fireproof
building used for a garage. A clause in the lease required the
lessor, in the event of fire, to abate the rent until the premises
were completely rebuilt and placed in tenantable condition. In
May, 1923, a statute was enacted prohibiting the erection for
garage purposes of any building not of fireproof construction if
more than two stories high. In 1927 fire destroyed the old build-
ing. The lessor offered to construct a three-story building like the
original, or a two-story, fireproof building at the lease rent. The
defendant declined the former, as it would not be permitted by law
to use it for a garage, and declined the latter unless the rent were
reduced. It demanded instead a three-story, fireproof building,
which the plaintiff claimed would cost a prohibitive sum and could
only be considered on a great increase in rent. The impasse was
complete. The plaintiff thereupon brought an action for a con-
struction of the lease and a declaratory judgment that by its offers
it had complied with its obligation under the lease as a condition
necessary to restore the duty to pay rent and that the defendant's
refusal to accept operated as a termination and forfeiture of the
lease. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in sustaining the posi-
tion of the plaintiff, said:
"In a case like the present, by proceeding according to the Declara-
tory Judgments Act, the parties avoid the necessity of first actually
erecting a building in order to be in a position to obtain a judicial con-
struction of their respective rights and liabilites. The lessor . . . can
have it judicially declared whether, under the governing rules of law,
the structure tendered meets the requirements of the situation, and, if
erected, would oblige the lessee, or the subtenant, to recommence
payment of the rent named in the contract of lease. Lessor can also
have a further declaration as to its rights consequent upon a refusal
by defendants to accept the kind of a building tendered; and this latter
declaration must be, as found by the court below, that the lease is at an
end and plaintiff can repossess itself of the demised premises.
"A prime purpose of the Declaratory Judgments Act is to render
'practical help' in ending controversies such as the one now before
us: Kariher's Petition (No. i), 284 Pa. 455, 471. Had defendants, in-
stead of refusing the offers of plaintiff, simply taken the position that,
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according to their understanding of the law applicable to the admitted
facts, the building tendered would not give them what they were en-
titled to under the lease, and, on that state of affairs, asked for a declara-
tory judgment, or joined with plaintiff in asking for such a judgment,
their respective rights might have been judicially declared. Then, after
such a determination of the governing principles of law as we have here
made, plaintiff could either have erected the proposed three-story build-
ing, and insisted on payment of rent for the balance of the term named
in the contract of lease, or, in place of actually building, plaintiff could
have given defendants notice that its offer to build was still open; if,
under these circumstances, defendants had persisted in their refusal,
plaintiff could have accepted such refusal as an abandonment of the
lease. In other words, had the parties seen fit, they could have had the
help of a judicial declaration of their respective rights and liabilities
before taking a definite stand amounting to ultimatum on each side and
asking for a declaratory judgment on that state of fact." 66
In a Kansas case the plaintiff school district claimed release
from a written guaranty to provide school rooms, because the legis-
ture had by the creation of a community high school relieved muchproperty from taxation and by this change of conditions justified
the plaintiff's release.6" So the obligee under a contract may claim
release from performance because of frustration by supervening
governmental order.
68
An interesting group of cases arises out of the effort of one of the
parties to a contract to secure a declaration of his release from its
obligations, because the other party has taken some action which
the petitioner regards as making it void or voidable or no longer
binding upon him. The risk of acting upon his own belief that he
is discharged from further performance is apparent, for he at once
exposes himself to a suit for damages or specific performance, or
66 Girard Trust Co. v. Tremblay Motor Co., 291 Pa. 507, 524-2S, 14o Atl. 5o6,
512-13 (1928); cf. Young v. New Zealand Ins. Co., 29 N. Z. 5o (igog) (where
plaintiff had refused to furnish plans for reconstruction by insurer of, destroyed
wooden building and then sought declaration of his duty to furnish plans prior to
insurer's election to reinstate. The declaration was granted because failure to have
a determination on the duty might cause loss of remedy).
67 School Dist. No. i9 of Sheridan County v. Sheridan Community High School,
730 Kan. 421, 286 Pac. 230 (1930).
68 Direct U. S. Cable Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., [1921] i Ch. 370 (that
plaintiff was disabled from repairing leased cable, by admiralty prohibition, and
hence escaped penalty); Waiwera Co-op. Dairy Co. Ltd. v. Wright, Stephenson &
Co. Ltd., 19 171 N. Z. 178 (plaintiff released, because Government had requisitioned
the material to be supplied).
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perhaps to forfeiture or other drastic sanction. By proceeding first
to submit the dispute to judicial determination of his rights in
the premises, he avoids that hazard and is assured of his rights
before acting. A leading case of this kind is the English case,
Soci~t6 Maritime et Commerciale v. Venus Steam Shipping Co.,
Ltd.9 Here the plaintiffs had undertaken by contract to load ore
on steamers to be furnished by one L, the alleged assignor of the
defendants, for five years. The plaintiffs contended that there
was no valid assignment to the defendants, that L was not the de-
fendants' agent, and that there was no novation. As the original
contract had over a year still to run, and as plaintiffs did not wish
to break it and subject themselves to an action for damages, they
availed themselves of the valuable privilege of seeking from the
court a declaration that the contract was no longer binding on
them. In making the declaration sought, Judge Channell re-
marked:
"Showing the necessity of a decision upon it, I think they are en-
titled to a declaration as to whether or not the contract is binding upon
them. They are not bound at their peril to refuse to perform it and
then to be liable to heavy damages for not performing it for the space
of the next year and a half. If they are wrong, they would be liable for
damages down to the time of the judgment of the Court while they
are refusing to perform; but upon the Court saying that they were
bound, they would then say: -'We will now go on with it for the
remainder of the time.' I think that is a sufficient reason [for making the
declaration] ." 70
So, a plaintiff often claims release from a contract by way of
anticipatory defense on the ground that the contract was obtained
from him by fraud or misrepresentation, 1 or that it was ultra vires
69 9 Com. Cas. 289, 291 (,904).
70 See also West Ham Corp. v. Sharp,- [i9o7] i K. B. 445; Pedersen v. Had-
dock, [I917] N. Z. 684 (plaintiff employer under a building contract claimed
declaration [by special case] that defendant contractor had no-right to compensa-
tion thereunder, when, after stopping work because of plaintiff's refusal to make
payments, he demanded interest on arrears and compensation).
71 Tofts v. Pearl Life Assur. Co. Ltd., [I9i] i K. B. i89 (assured seeks declara-
tion that policies were obtained from him by fraud of defendant's agent, alleging
falsely that plaintiff had insurable interest) ; Hulton v. Hulton, [1916] 2 K. B. 642
(declaration sought by married woman that she was not bound by certain contract
of separation obtained from her by fraud; to the same effect, Slingerland v. Slinger-
land, Iog Minn. 407, 124 N. W. i9 (i9io); Haskew v. Equity Trustees, etc., 27
C. L. R. 231 (1919) (plaintiff seeks declaration that transfer of his property to de-
fendant, for daughter, had been procured by fraud); Attorney General of N. S.
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the plaintiff,72 or because the debt or obligation was canceled or-
terminated by the defendant's own act, 73 or because the plaintiff's
own act had discharged his obligation to the defendant, 4 or because
of a claim by the defendant deemed by the plaintiff to vary the con-
tract,75 or because of some change made in the contract relation by
the acts of the defendant or others."
Wales v. Peters, 34 C. L. R. 146 (1924) (Government contract alleged obtained by
defendant by fraud, and Government relieved from obligation); De Chateau v.
Child, [1928] N. Z. 63 (plaintiff sues to establish that mortgage given to defendant,
who sought to exercise power of sale, was wrongly obtained) ; Harris v. Richardson,
[1929] N. Z. 668 (that plaintiff's sale to defendant money-lender at low figure was
void for undue influence).
In this category are actions by insurance companies to declare the invalidity of
policies obtained by fraud, sometimes before any loss has occurred; or by those
prospectively liable under negotiable instruments. Commercial Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. McLoon, 14 Allen 351 (Mass. 1867) ; Globe Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Reals, 79 N. Y.
202 (1879). In the English cases of Brooking v. Maudslay, Son & Field, 38 Ch. D.
636 (1888), and Honour v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., [igoO] i Ch. 852, the declara-
tions were refused, on the ground that the company should not thus anticipate its
defense, which it might be in a better position to assert after the beneficiary sues on
the policy. The ground is not convincing. To a similar effort to have the policy
declared void in equity after the loss had occurred, but before suit by the beneficiary,
the Connecticut Supreme Court, reversing the lower court which had sustained the
action as valid under the Declaratory Judgments Act, held that it was to be dealt
with as the company had elected, and that equitable relief was inappropriate, ap-
parently inferring that it might have been brought under the Declaratory Judgments
Act. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Richmond, 107 Conn. 117, 139 Atl. 702 (1927).
72 Tataurangi Tairuakena v. Carr, [1927] N. Z. 24o, 688.
73 Tozer v. Viola, [1918] I Ch. 75 (lessee claims declaration that lease was ter-
minated) ; Tattersall v. Saden, [1928] i Ch. 318 (plaintiff dentist obtained declara-
tion that partnership agreement with defendant was dissolved by defendant's failure
to pay dues to Dental Board); Bakker v. Winkler, [1929] 4 D. L. R. i07 (plaintiff
claims that contract was terminated and discharged, and that plaintiff was under
no duty to grant sublease) ; R. G. Z. 74, 292 (I9Io) (purchaser, after his right to
cancel had expired, claimed declaration that he does not owe vendor money due,,
because of breach of warranty of condition); R. G. Z. 95, 260 (1919) (debt claimed
cancelled by creditor).
74 Mitchell-Henry v. Norwich Union Life Ins. Soc., Ltd., [1918] 2 K. B. 67
(plaintiff claims that by sending money through the mail he had discharged his
obligation, though the money was stolen); Paddy v. Clutton, [1920] 2 Ch. 554
(borrower from liquidated insurance company claims release from debt by having
offered to offset value of unmatured policy).
75 Lion White Lead, Ltd. v. Rogers, 25 C. L. R. 533 (918) (plaintiff inventor
seeks declaration of nullity, that he is not bound to turn over his invention to de-
fendant, because of breach by third person) ; Crofts v. Stewart's Trustee, [1929]
Sess. Cas. 891 (Scotland) (plaintiff vendee claims release from purchase, because
defendant vendor claimed right to reserve minerals).
76 Hadham Rural Dist. Council v. Crallan, [1914] 2 Ch. 138 (municipal cor-
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Release from an asserted obligation or threatened demand may
be sought on the ground that there was a defect in form in contract-
ing the obligation,"7 or that for some other reason it was void or be-
came unenforceable by law.
In Handover v. Langman, Judge Long-Innis said:
"There is no doubt that in the case of a transaction void at law, but
where the defect does not appear on the face of the instrument, the party
desiring to defeat the instrument is not bound to wait until it is used
against him, but may anticipate that danger and institute a suit in equity
for an appropriate declaration and to have the instrument delivered up
to be cancelled." 79
A similar legal situation is involved in cases where a duty is im-
posed by contract or law and the plaintiff contends that a change in
conditions has rendered it inequitable or improper to exact the per-
formance of the duty."0
poration claims release from liability to supply water to defendant, because of change
of user) ; Smith v. Wood, [1929] 1 Ch. 14 (guarantor claims release from guaranty,
because one of several joint guarantors had been released); Saunders v. Baker,
[xg16] N. Z. 1137 (guarantor of interest on mortgage claims that bankruptcy of
mortgagor has discharged the guaranty).
77 Rice v. Franklin Loan & Finance Co., 82 Colo. 163, 258 Pac. 223 (1927) (that
plaintiff's note and chattel mortgage are void because of usurious interest violating
statute); Lodge v. National Union Investment Co., Ltd., [19o7] i Ch. 300 (because
promisee was a money-lender not registered); Chapman v. Michaelson, [igos]
2 Ch. 612, [1909] i Ch. 238; Schnelle v. Dent, 35 C. L. R. 494 (1924) (that plain-
tiff's bills of sale and mortgages were void); Handover v. Langman, 29 N. S. W.
435 (1929), rev'd, 43 C. L. R. 334 (1929) (claim that mortgages given to money-
lender defendant were void).
78 Leonard v. Leonard, 2oi N. Y. Supp. 113 (1922) (that plaintiff's acceptance
of notes from defendants was void, because beyond defendants' power to execute.
Denied); York Corp. v. Henry Leetham & Sons, Ltd., [1924] i Ch. 557 (plaintiff's
agreement alleged ultra vires); Barnes v. Cadogan Developments, Ltd., [i93o]
x Ch. 479 (that vendee, owing to variations in description and unknown conditions,
was privileged to repudiate); Bacchus Marsh Concentrated Milk Co. v. Nathan,
26 C. L. R. 410 (1919) (that defendant could not enforce certain covenants against
plaintiff); Life Ins. Co. of Australia Ltd. v. Phillips, 36 C. L. R. 6o (1925) (that
policy void for ambiguity. Denied); Ball v. Stevenson, [i925] N. Z. 616 (mort-
gage and bill of sale invalid for lack of consideration).
79 29 N. S. W. 435, 437, 438 (1929), rev'd, 43 C. L. R. 334 (1929), on the ground
that the plaintiff must offer to return the amount borrowed, as a condition of
having the mortgage declared void.
80 Manchester Corp. v. Audenshaw Urban Dist. Council, [1928] 1 Ch. 127, 763.
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Building and Other Contractual Restrictions on the Use of Land
It is not uncommon that restrictions in deeds or long-term con-
tracts become burdensome and perhaps inappropriate, due to the
changes wrought by time and circumstance. The parties to the
instruments containing such restrictions can not safely undertake
to violate or disregard them, however, without some judicial assur-
ance that their view of the present impropriety or desuetude of such
old restrictions is maintainable. Equity will enforce such restric-
tions, at the behest of the beneficiary, when their violation is
threatened, and, in the action for enforcement, will determine
whether they are still binding. But equity will not, at the behest
of the burdened party, short of his taking positive action to disre-
gard the restriction, determine the validity of the restriction; it
thus leaves him in suspense and under the necessity either of ob-
serving the restriction or of incurring forfeiture, ejectment, and
damages, in order to test his right to release therefrom. This was
well brought out in the very recent case of Hess v. Country Club
Park,8 in which the California Supreme Court, referring to the
earlier case of Strong v. Shatto, said:
" The doctrine that equity will not enforce restrictions on the use of
property, we think, only applies to cases where it is sought to enforce such
restrictions by equitable proceedings, where the reason and justification
for them has failed through changed conditions. In other words, under
such circumstances a court of equity may deny the relief sought. But
the rule does not go to the extent of permitting parties whose land is
subject to the legal restraint of such limitations to bring action to quiet
their title against such contractual obligations, because of changed con-
ditions. Contractual obligations do not disappear as circumstances
change. It is only the granting of equitable relief, and not the binding
force of the restrictive covenant, that is affected by a change in the con-
ditions. . . . As there has been no breach of the conditions here, and
no attempt to enjoin such a breach or to enforce a forfeiture, we think
it premature, at least, to determine the equities of the parties as they
might exist at some future time in the event of suchbreach." 82
But the action for a declaratory judgment has accomplished
the important result that it enables a covenantor, without prior
812 Pac.(2d) 782 (Cal. 1931). See case below, 296 Pac. 300 (193i).
82 45 Cal. App. 29, 37, 38, 187 Pac. i59, 162-63 (I9M9).
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breach of the restriction and the resulting risks, to seek and, if
proper, obtain a declaration of his privilege to depart from the
restriction, because of a change in circumstances or because it is
for any other reason no longer deemed binding. The power of
" any per son interested under a deed, will, or written instrument,
or under a contract, or who desires a declaration of his rights or
duties with respect . . . to, in, over, or upon property," in case
of actual controversy, to " bring an action . . . for a declaration
of his rights and duties in the premises," 83 enables the plaintiff to
" proceed thereunder and to have his status declared under the
conditions as were then shown to exist, and this, notwithstanding
the old rule which required him to be hazardously active in the
breach of such restrictions and passive in litigation." 84
The California Supreme Court expressed its appreciation of the
declaratory form of relief in such cases of doubt, fear, dilemma,
and controversy, in the following words:
"The pleadings in this case present a practical situation which calls
for declaratory relief. The owner of a lot in a tract of land claims
that certain restrictive covenants and conditions are no longer enforce-
able because of a change in the character of the neighborhood. The
original grantor and the owners of other lots in the tract claim, on the
contrary, that the covenants and conditions are still enforceable, that
they constitute easements upon the lot in question, and that their viola-
tion will be ground for injunctive relief and the forfeiture of the lot own-
er's title. If the lot owner can obtain a declaration in his favor, he may
9afely proceed to improve his property as he wishes. If such a declara-
tion is refused, he is put in the hazardous position of being obliged to
violate the terms of the restrictions before he can know whether or not
he must suffer the penalties mentioned. It is inconceivable that he must
run the risk of forfeiting any further investment, or even his title to the
land, in order to obtain an adjudication of his rights. It seems clear that
the declaratory relief statute was intended to relieve a party from
exactly such a dilemma." 85
83 This is the wording of the Cal. Act of X921; § xo6o, C. C. P. The Act pro-
vides, to make assurance certain, that "such declaration may be had before there
has been any breach of the obligation."
84 Concurring opinion of Shenk, J., in Strong v. Hancock, 201 Cal. 530, 554,
258 Pac. 6o, 7o (1927), quoted with approval by Waste, C. J., in Hess v. Country
Club Park, 2 Pac.(2d) 782, 783 (Cal. X931).
85 2 Pac.(2d) at 783.
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The situation usually arises between grantee and grantor or
vendee and vendor, the former desiring either to build on or other-
wise to enjoy his land free from the restrictions imposed by the
deed or contract. In Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Sahlem,88
only one of many defendants held out against the claim of the
church that it was free to build a church in disregard of a restric-
tion limiting the use of the land to residential purposes. The
church had, in fact, begun to break ground on the strength of its
belief in the righteousness of its conduct, but, affected by growing
doubts, thought it safer to sue the recalcitrant covenantee for a
declaration of its privilege. In the court below its claim was sus-
tained. In the Court of Appeals, however, Chief Judge Cardozo
for the court, in denying the claim, commended its caution in pro-
ceeding first to secure a declaratory judgment before incurring
the wasteful and unnecessary expense and damages which the
further prosecution of the proposed plan for the church building
would have entailed. He added:
" Here is no case of irreparable hardship, shocking to the conscience,
as where a mandatory injunction would destroy a finished building to
vindicate a doubtful right. . . Here is a case where the building is
yet a plan, the work on it preliminary, the outlay unsubstantial, the
act to be absolved still waiting for the doer. His path has been made
easy by a judicial declaration that the wrong may go on without an-
noying interference." s7
In the rapid expansion of cities in the twentieth century and the
change of neighborhoods from residential to business and of the
construction of apartment dwellings for private houses, it is quite
common for covenantors to claim the privilege of building struc-
tures of a type different from that required in a restrictive cove-
nafnt. The declaratory judgment has been praised by courts as
"the most inexpensive and expeditious method of adjusting the
dispute." 88
In such cases the plaintiff -must usually make the issue concrate
86 254 N. Y. i6r, 172 N. E. 455 (1930).
87 Id. at 169, i72 N. E. at 458.
88 Brown v. Levin, 295 Pa. 530, 145 Ati. 593 (T929), where the plaintiff, owner
of a corner lot, who was restricted against building within 25 feet of the street, suc-.
cessfully sustained his privilege of building within 25 feet of the side street, for other-
wise the lot would have been rendered useless to him.
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and definite, thus evidencing the actuality of the controversy, by
stating in his complaint, and, if necessary, proving, his intention
and proposal to build a specific type of building and that such a
building escapes, or if he so contends, conforms to, the restric-.
tions contained in the covenant,89 or that the covenant itself is
void or has become invalid."0 A breach of contract, trespass, for-
feiture, ejectment, or a stoppage of private or public improvements
is thereby avoided.
The action may also arise in the form of a petition by the cove-
nantee for a declaration that the restrictions are valid and that
the proposed threat of the defendant to disregard them is unlaw-
ful." While injunction might in some of these cases lie, the risk
of failing to meet the necessary conditions of an injunction, the
89 One and Three South William Street Bldg. Corp. v. Gardens Corp., 133 Misc.
790, 233 N. Y. Supp. 473 (1929), 232 App. Div. 58, 248 N. Y. Supp. 743 (1931);
Garvin & Co., Inc. v. Lancaster County, 290 Pa. 448, 139 Atl. 154 (1927) (that
plaintiff is privileged to build 4- and 6-story buildings on the land, notwithstanding
defendant's easement of light and air. Held, for defendant, but plaintiff held
privileged to build 2-story building); Hoffman's Petition, 7 D. & C. 88 (Pa. 1925),
held, for defendant. In Assets Co. v. Ogilvie, 24 R. 400, 34 S. L. R. i95, 4 S. L. T.
195 (z896), the declaration granted limited the declaration sought by restricting
the plaintiff to certain types of houses.
90 Strong v. Hancock, 201 Cal. 530, 258 Pac. 60 (1927) (purchaser at fore-
closure claims declaration that restrictions, breach of which would work forfeiture,
were cleared by the foreclosure); Hess v. Country Club Park, 2 Pac.(2d) 782
(Cal. 1931); Village of Grosse Pointe Shores v. Ayres, 235 N. W. 829 (Mich. x931)
(that conditions imposed by defendant in deed to plaintiff, relating to telegraph
poles, water system, etc., were void); Vogeler v. Alwyn Improvement Corp., 247
N. Y. 131, 159 N. E. 886 (1928), reV'g 22o App. Div. 829, 222 N. Y. Supp. 918
(1928) (that restrictions in deed creating easement in defendant's favor are not
enforceable. Held, for defendant); McCarter v. New Rochelle Homestead Co.,
139 Misc. 672, 249 N. Y. Supp. 23 (i931) (that defendant vendor, no longer owning
property in neighborhood, has no interest in maintenance of restrictions. So held) ;
Barmack v. Barwick, 8 D. & C. 479 (Pa. 1926) (where plaintiff seller relieved his
own doubts and the fears of a title guaranty company and the refusal of defendant
purchaser to take title without such guaranty, by declaratory judgment that-d
covenant of 1814 deed restricting building to three-story brick was personal only
and did not run with land).
91 In Bristol v. Woodward, 251 N. Y. 275, 167 N. E. 44i (1929), the plaintiff
grantor of several plots sold to A and B restricted their resale by A and B to i/2-acre
lots, but on a sale to C restricted resale to i/4-acre lots. On C's threat to sub-
divide accordingly, B gave notice of protest and resistance, whereupon the original
grantor successfully sued all the grantees for a declaratory judgment that he was
privileged to differentiate in the restrictions placed on A, B, and C. In Ives v.
Brown, [3919] 2 Ch. 314, plaintiff sought a declaration that the defendant had no-
right to violate building restrictions on the defendant's property.
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cost of a bond, and the consequences of broken economic rela-
tions are avoided by an action the sole purpose and effect of which
is to clarify a doubtful, uncertain, and challenged legal relation
and to stabilize it before damage has been done.
Peril in Lease Relations
Among the most common cases of contractual relations in
which the declaratory judgment has proved efficacious are those
arising out of long-term leases. A common clause in such leases
is the restriction of the right of the lessee to assign or sublet
without the landlord's consent, which, it is often added, shall
not be unreasonably withheld. Whether the word "unreason-
ably" is included or not, the arbitrary refusal of the landlord to
grant consent or the imposition of unusual conditions upon the
grant, gives rise to a dispute between the parties as to whether
the consent was lawfully withheld or the conditions lawfully
imposed. The lessee could, if he thought the consent improperly
withheld, make the sublease notwithstanding, thus incurring the
risks of two lawsuits -one against himself for forfeiture and
damages, and one against the subtenant for trespass and eject-
ment. It is, moreover, probably doubtful whether a subtenant
would care to buy a lawsuit. If the lessee wished to sue the land-
lord for damages for arbitrary refusal of consent, he would usu-
ally have to move out to maintain the action advantageously. The
awkwardness of any of these solutions is apparent. A way out of
the deadlock is afforded by an action for a declaratory judgment
that the plaintiff lessee, having a subtenant willing to take, is
privileged to assign or sublet without the consent of the landlord,
under the circumstances of the case.2 In such cases, the plaintiff
92 Mr. Carmody, in his NEw YORK PRACTICE (1923) § 304, thus describes a
parallel case under the procedure as it existed before the declaratory judgment was
available in New York: "Plaintiff, desiring to assign the lease to W and being
unable to get the landlord's consent, assigned to W without it, but the sublease
was conditioned upon the undisputed and undisturbed possession of W for a
period. W went into possession. The landlord gave notice of termination of the
lease, rejected W as a tenant and notified W that the supply of steam and hot water
would be discontinued. W vacated the premises, the tenant resumed possession.
He refused to pay rent. The landlord brought this summary proceeding to recover
possession of the premises. The tenant counterclaimed in the summary proceeding
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may or may not obtain the exact declaration requested." In
either case, the cloud on the respective rights of the parties has
been removed before the fatal step has been taken of acting on
one's own belief or supposition, and the parties may proceed in the
assurance that they are within their legal rights, as conclusively
determined by a court. The privilege to sublet without consent
may be challenged by a sublessee, actual or potential, who ques-
tions the privilege or power of his lessor defendant, as in the case
of a purchaser of a lease from a bankrupt sublessee."
The validity of a lease may be challenged by third parties be-
fore action has been taken under it. This cloud, also, may most
appropriately be removed by declaratory judgment. In an inter-
esting Arizona case, the validity of a lease with a city was chal-
lenged by a taxpayer and city officials, thus casting a cloud on the
lessee's rights and placing in jeopardy extensive improvements
about to be made on the leased premises. The Arizona Supreme
Court said:
"It would seem, in view of the improvements contemplated [$300,-
coo], their extent and the cost thereof, that plaintiff should, if possible,
be assured that the lease is valid before making improvements. The
building proposed to be constructed will become a part of the realty,
and, should the lease be void or invalid and voidable, the investment
for damages sustained through the landlord's breach of this covenant of the lease
by refusing to give his consent to the subletting. The jury returned a verdict in
favor of the tenant in the sum of $7,045.a9." Broadway and Ninety-fourth Street,
Inc., Landlord v. C. & L. Lunch Co., Tenant, ii6 Misc. 440, igo N. Y. Supp. 563
(1921).
93 General construction of the right to sublet: Marcel, Inc. v. Sol & S. Marcus
Co., '75 N. E. 83 (Mass. 1931); Butterick Pub. Co. v. Fulton & Elm Leasing Co.,
Inc., 132 Mssc. 366, 229 N. Y. Supp. 86 (1928); Klein's Rapid Shoe Repair Co.,
Inc. v. Sheppardel Realty Co., Inc., 136 Misc. 332, 241 N. Y. Supp. 153 (1929).
No reason for refusal of consent shown: Cornish v. Boles, i9 D. L. R. 447,
(1914). Right to sublet not personal: Foreman Automobile Co. v. Morris, i98 Ky.
1, 248 S. W. 486 (1922); Francis v. Ferguson, 246 N. Y. 516, 159 N. E. 416 (1927).
Refusal based on the nationality of the sublessee: Mills v. Cannon Brewery Co.,
Ltd., [1920] 2 Ch. 38; Lempriere v. Burghes, [X921] N. Z. 307.
Effect of lessee's bankruptcy: In re Farrow's Bank, Ltd., [1921] 2 Ch. 164. Re-
fused by lessor's successor: In re Winfrey and Chatterton's Agreement, [1921] 2 Ch.
7. Refusal to lose good tenant: Houlders Bros. & Co. Ltd. v. Gibbs, [1925] i Ch.
X98.
Judgment for the defendant: In re Robert Stephenson & Co., Ltd., [1915] 1 Ch.
802 ; In re Connor, 30 N. Z. 437 (1911).
.4 In re Robert Stephenson & Co., Ltd., [1915] 1 Ch. 802.
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would be a total loss to the plaintiff. When the validity of the lease
is challenged on the ground of lack of power in the city to make it, or
the incapacity of the plaintiff to make the contract, or any of the other'
grounds urged, safe and sound business demands that such questions be
settled before the expenditure of so large a sum as $3oo,ooo, and such
questions should be settled as early as convenient, because the covenant
to pay the stipulated monthly rental begins at the commencement of the
lease, to wit, July i9, 1929. ' 95
The privileges and duties connected with renewal of leases give
rise to similar doubts and fears. Before the expiration of a lease,
containing an option to renew or purchase, lessor and lessee may
find themselves in dispute as to the right to renew or purchase,
or to exercise the right under given conditions or at a certain
time. The conflict throws into doubt and uncertainty the rights
of both parties when later the lease expires or the option becomes
exercisable, and it becomes important to know immediately
whether the right to renew or purchase exists or not. Present
peace of mind and social security often require that future rights
under contract be clarified when thrown into doubt. For the
dissipation of these clouds, the declaratory judgment .has proved
an efficacious instrument. In the case of New Plymouth Borough
Council v. Bonner," Judge Smith remarked, " where parties to a
lease desire to ascertain in advance the proper construction of the
right of renewal, an appropriate procedure is the issue of an origi-
nating summons for the purpose. . . ." They thereby avoid not
only breaches of the lease, but often torts as well. Lessees usually
claim, against a lessor who threatens to sell or otherwise to disre-
gard their privilege of renewal or purchase at or before the expira-
tion of the lease, that the privilege still exists and can not be
disregarded."
95 Woodward et al. v. Fox West Coast Theaters, 36 Ariz. 251, 255, 284 Pac.
350, 35, (93o).
96 [1929] N. Z. 217, 219.
97 Renewal rights under administrative leases: Tinkler v. Public Trustee, 28
N. Z. 238 (I9O9) (duties as binding on Public Trustee); Williamson v. Auckland
Hospital & Charitable Aid Board, 33 N. Z. xo48 (1914) (administrative powers.
effect of change of statutes); St. Leger v. Marsh & Attorney-General, [1gi7]
N. Z. 365 (effect of change of statutes); Lethbridge v. Otago Land Board, [1929]
N. Z. 833 (administrative procedure).
Other renewal problems: Edwards et al. v. Bernstein, 238 Ky. 38, 21 S. W.(2d)
133 (1929), 36 S. W.(2d) 66z.(r93I) (rent); Leibowitz v. Bickford's Lunch Sys-
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On the other hand, the lessor, desiring to sell or re~nter -
though the lessee has claimed in opposition the privilege of re-
newal or purchase under option- may himself bring an action
for a declaratory judgment that the lessee has no right to exercise
the claimed option,"8 or that he has lost it,"9 or that he has no right
to hold over after expiration of the lease.' 0 Or the controversy
may turn on the terms and conditions of renewal, such as the
period of renewal, the rent to be paid, the method by which the
rent is to be fixed or determined.'
tern, 241 N. Y. 489, I5o N. E. 525 (1926) (competing option); Aaron v. Wood-
cock, 283 Pa. 33, 128 Atl. 665 (1925) (term); Southern Style Shops v. Mann,
157 Tenn. i, 4 S. W.(2d) 959 (1928) (second lease involved).
Problems of options to buy: Savin v. Delaney, 229 Ky. 226, 16 S. W.(2d)
1039 (1929) (competing option) ; In re Leeds & Batley Breweries Ltd., and Brad-
bury's Lease, [1920] ; Ch. 548 (holding-over tenant claims); Sherwood v.
Tucker, [1924] 2 Ch. 42 (continued existence claimed); Southee v. Finnis, [1917]
N. Z. 341 (notice given, or continued existence, claimed); Stannard v. Nicholas,
[192o] N. Z. 78 (notice of exercise, or continued existence, claimed).
98 Renewal problems. Failure to exercise: Braun v. Leo G. MacLaughlin, 93
Cal. App. 116, 269 Pac. 191 (1928) (asserted by successor to title); Murray
Motor Co. v. Overby, 217 Ky. 298, 289 S. W. 307 (1926) (failure to meet higher
rent); Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Levin, 128 Misc. 838, 221 N. Y. Supp.
269 (1927) (lease to third person, validity of notice); Spector v. Bonwit, Teller
& Co., 1O D. & C. l1 (Pa. 1928) (time for notice). See also Budge v. Bayly,
31 N. Z. 97 (1912) (renewal affected by subsequent statutes); Loughnan v.
Jamieson, [1928] N. Z. 298 (effect of failure to take required valuation pro-
ceedings).
99 Renewal problems. Denial of existence: Raynolds v. Browning, King &
Co., 123 Misc. 367, 2o5 N. Y. Supp. 748 (1924) (termination of trust asserted by
devisees under will); Gray v. Spyer, [1921] 2 Ch. 549, [1922] 2 Ch. 22 (per-
petual option to renew denied by grantor's successor).
Option to buy problems. Denial of existence: Ohio-Kentucky Coal Co. v.
Auxier, 39 S. W.(2d) 662 (Ky. 193) (denied by successor in title of alleged
grantor) ; Rider v. Ford, [1923] I Ch. 541 (exercise after holding over denied).
100 In re Joel's Lease, Berwick v. Baird, [1930] 2 Ch. 359. Here the lessor
denied that the lessee had a "holding" within the meaning of a statute giving
special privileges as to holding over.
101 Term: Aaron v. Woodcock, 283 Pa. 33, 128 Ati. 665 (1925) (io years v.
year to year); Re Jackson & Imperial Bank of Canada, 39 Ont. L. R. 334 (1917)
(perpetuity v. 25 years).
Rent questions: Rosenblatt v. Surprise Building Co., 223 App. Div. 426, 228
N. Y. Supp. 369 (1928) (abatement claimed for loss of vault license); New York
Business Buildings Corp. v. James McCutcheon & Co., 229 App. Div. 681, 243
N. Y. Supp. 255 (1930), aff'd, 257 N. Y. 554 (1931) (liability for rent); Southern
Style Shops v. Mann, 157 Tenn. 1, 4 S. W.(2d) 959 (1928) (right to renew on
same terms as other lessee had given) ; Bodega Co., Ltd. v. Read, [1914] 2 Ch.
'283, 757 (right to certain reductions under statute) ; Firth v. Halloran, 38 C. L. R.
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So the lessee -seeking to avoid the risk of forfeiture or dam-
ages- may claim other privileges under the lease or deny the
lessor's right to act as he threatens, or to forfeit the lease. Thus,
the lessee, claiming a new or different privilege not mentioned
in the lease, may assert - against the opposition of the lessor -
the privilege of demolishing the old building without incurring
forfeiture, 0 2 the privilege of taking certain steps under the
lease,"' or that the lessor has no right to bar the lessee from exer-
cising the claimed privilege 104 or to cancel the lease,0 5 or even that
261 (1926) (liability for rent in case of conflicting leases); Gisborne Harbour
Board v. Barker & Barker, 29 N. Z. 8oz (igog) (duty to accept renewal prior
to fixing of rent).
Valuation questions: United Cigar Stores of America v. Norwood, 124 Misc.
488, 208 N. Y. Supp. 420 (1925) (basis: rent value v. land value); New Plymouth
Borough Council v. Bonner, [1929] N. Z. 217.
102 Washington-Detroit Theatre Co. v. Moore, 249 Mich. 673, 229 N. W. 618
(1930) (lessee claims privilege of demolishing a building and erecting a new one,
and of using it for other than theater purposes); cf. Willing v. Chicago Audito-
rium Ass'n, 277 U. S. 274 (1928), in which, under ordinary procedure, the plain-
tiff was in effect told that he must tear down the building and risk the forfeiture
of 99- and 198-year leases, in order to secure a decision on the issue whether he
was privileged to demolish and rebuild.
03 Foreman Automobile Co. v. Morris, 198 Ky. 1, 248 S. W. 486 (1922)
(that he was privileged to assign, without forfeiture) ; In re Dott's Lease, [2920]
i Ch. 281 (that increase in admission price is no breach) ; Premier Dairies, Ltd. v.
Garlick, [2920] 2 Ch. 17 (that plaintiff lessee is privileged to remove certain
buildings which he had erected); Cronholm v. Cole, [1928] 2 D. L. R. 65 (that
plaintiff had not breached lease, and was relieved from forfeiture); R. G. Z. 42,
345 (1898) (that lessee privileged to hunt).
104 Equitable Gas Co. v. Smith, 23 D. & C. 6T6 (Pa. 1929) (the plaintiff
assignee of a lease of the oil and gas rights sought a declaration that the defend-
ant, who claims the title to the land, had no right to exclude the plaintiff from
drilling, because the oil rights were reserved by the original grantor, through
whom both parties claim).
McFadden v. Lick Pier Co., ioi Cal. App. 12, 281 Pac. 429 (2929) (that the
lessor has no lien upon lessee's furniture brought into the building). Under the
old procedure, such a case would develop as follows: The lessor, learning that his
tenant is about to move out-claiming that privilege under the lease-seizes the
lessee's furniture. The lessee then may bring an action for replevin, furnishing
heavy bond, in order to get his furniture. That suit will not determine his right
to move out under the lease. A second action will be necessary for that, the two
actions consuming, in a city like New York, possibly two years. The expense,
the long suspense with the contingent liability of lessee for rent or of lessor for
damages, do not commend this action as expedient. Cf. Bentz v. Barclay, 294
Pa. 300, i44 Atl. 280 (1928).
105 British Columbia Thoroughbred Ass'n, Ltd. v. Brighouse & Brighouse Park,
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a past act of his, attacked by the lessor, was lawful, and that the
consequent threat of forfeiture is without merit.'
On the other hand, the lessor, bothered by the lessee's claim of
continued rights under the lease, may sue to establish his privi-
lege of letting the premises to a third party under the circum-
stances," 7 or not to lease to the defendant,0 8 or to terminate the
lease,'0 ' or to reenter, 11 or to distrain for rent,"' or to establish
the defendant lessee's no-right to do certain things, such as to cut
or sell timber or to remove fixtures."2
In some of these cases an injunction might have lain, and in
the proceedings the rights of the parties might have been deter-
mined and declared; in others, an injunction would have been im-
possible. What the declaratory judgment of the court effected
was relief from uncertainty, risks, and insecurity; and by stabiliz-
ing the legal relations between the parties, the court made possible
the continued execution, in peace and concord, of a contract -
a social instrument of value to both parties and to society at large.
The contest between them was in these cases just as vigorously
Ltd., 31 B. C. R. 381 (1922) (no-right to cancel the lease and relet to other de-
fendant).
106 That plaintiff lessee was not subject to forfeiture of lease for non-payment
of rent, forced by lessor's re-entry. Suttie v. Te Winitana Tupotahi, 33 N. Z.
1216 (1914).
107 Murray Motor Co. v. Overby, 217 Ky. 198, 289 S. W. 507 (1926) (on
ground that defendant lessee had refused to pay higher rent [in accordance with
lease] when it was obtainable from a third party).
108 Bakker v. Winkler, [1929] 4 D. L. R. 107 (that prospective lessor under
no duty to grant lease, inasmuch as contract was discharged); Bernard Hughes,
Ltd. v. Hughes, Dickson & Co., Ltd., [1923] i Ir. R. 121 (whether, under inden-
ture, plaintiffs were bound to execute lease to defendants).
100 Raynolds v. Browning, King & Co., 123 Misc. 367, 2o5 N. Y. Supp. 748
(1924) (that the lease had terminated by expiration of the underlying trust);
In re Lancashire & Yorkshire Bank's Lease v. Davis, 11914] 1 Ch. 522 (that lessor
may terminate lease at date earlier than defendant lessee admits). Conversely, the
lessor may sue to establish the invalidity of lessee's notice to terminate. Simons v.
Associated Furnishers, Ltd., [i93i] i Ch. 379.
110 Kenmont Coal Co. v. Hall, 40 S. W.(2d) 3o (Ky. 193); Fidelity & Colum-
bia Trust Co. v. Levin, 128 Misc. 838, 221 N. Y. Supp. 269 (1927) (claims right to
possession, because defendant has failed to renew lease).
111 In re Wells, [1929] 2 Ch. 269.
112 Horlick v. Scully, [1927] 2 Ch. iSo (lessor sues to fix lessee's duty to
maintain grounds) ; Speyer v. Phillipson, [1931] 1 Ch. 183 (lessor sought to estab-
lish lessee's no-right to remove antique panels built into an apartment); In re
Rotoiti, No. 5B. Block, [1923] N. Z. 61g.
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conducted before breach as it would have been after breach, but
the unhappy results of a breach have been avoided for both par-
ties by a determination of the issue before damage or violence
was done.
Debtor v. Creditor
It frequently happens that a debtor, subject to an actual or po-
tential demand of a creditor which he believes unwarranted, wishes
and needs to relieve his anxiety and uncertainty by securing a
definition of his obligations to his creditor. A useful social serv-
ice is performed by the courts in the clarification of the doubtful
legal relations thus posited, by permitting the debtor to institute
the action, either claiming absolution from or a limitation of lia-
bility, or seeking a conclusive definition of the terms or condi-
tions of the debt. While he may thus be anticipating a defense to
an enforcement proceeding brought by the creditor, it often be-
comes exceedingly important to clarify the debtor-creditor rela-
tion before the debt, if any, becomes due or before the creditor
may see fit to institute an action. The law has long been familiar
with the admiralty and other actions for the limitation of a
debtor's own liability. A common method of achieving that re-
sult with respect to all types of claims is by a proceeding for a
declaration of limited liability. These cases make it clear that it
is immaterial to the question of justiciability whether creditor or
debtor commences the action.113
When several creditors make demand upon a debtor for the same
debt, it is natural that he should seek protection from multiple
liability by asking for a declaratory judgment. This is the foun-
dation of the equitable interpleader; the desired result is usually
obtained more expeditiously by an action for a declaration of
rights. Stakeholders, including executors and others, uncertain
as to how and to whom funds are to be dispensed, commonly resortf
to the declaratory judgment for authoritative judicial instruction,
determination, and protection. Receivers and others frequently
113 Said the United States Supreme Court in Fidelity Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v.
Swope, 274 U. S. 123, 131 (1927): " [The issues] cannot be deemed any the less so
[a case or controversy] because through a modified procedure the parties are re-
versed and the same issues are raised and finally determined at the behest of the
city," the city seeking a declaration that certain improvement bonds were valid.
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-have occasion to question the rank or priority of claims made
upon a trust estate, and settle the issue by instituting a proceed-
ing for a judgment declaring the priorities. By obtaining an
authoritative determination of the issue before action upon his
own view may have become prejudicial, the plaintiff avoids the
breach of a contract or the commission of a tort, and possibly even
of a crime. The resolution of his own doubts and the fears of
others has quieted an uncertain legal relation and served as an
instrument of preventive relief and social appeasement.
Thus, a debtor may sue for a declaration that an alleged creditor
has no claim upon him.1 " To receivers and fiduciaries dealing
with trust funds, distributable in the course of or after the liquida-
tion of claims, this opportunity of determining the validity of
claims against the trust estate or the proper beneficiaries of a
distribution is indispensable. 15 The device applies equally to
situations in which not the validity but the amount of the indebted-
ness is placed in issue." 6
114 Cloverdale Union High School District v. Peters, 88 Cal. App. 731, 264 Pac.
273 (1928) (that defendant has no right to claim salary under alleged contract);
Redebiaktiebolaget Argonaut v. Hani, [1918] 2 K. B. 247 (that defendant alleged
undisclosed principal has no standing or claim); St. Catharines v. H. E. P. Com-
mission, [1928] 1 D. L. R. 598, [1930) 1 D. L. R. 409 (plaintiff city claims declara-
tion of no duty to pay defendant road builders); Wellington City Corp. v. Compton,
[1916] N. Z. 779 (that plaintiff is not under duty to make compensation to defend-
ant for improvements); Reicharbeitergericht, March i, 193o, Bensheimer IX, 3x
(employer seeks declaration that defendant employees who have not appeared
against him have no further claim against him).
15 Kendall v. San Pedro Lumber Co., 98 Cal. App. 242, 276 Pac. 1042 (1929)
(that plaintiff trustee does not owe defendant creditor a certain sum) ; In re Francke
& Rasch, [i918] i Ch. 470 (custodian seeks declaration of his duty to accept claims
against enemy) ; In re North Eastern Ins. Co., [igg] i Ch. 198 (receiver seeks
declaration of non-existence of certain claims of debenture holders, because de-
bentures void). See also In re Express Engineering Works, Ltd., [1920] 1 Ch. 466;
R. G. Z. 116, 368 (1927) (plaintiff receiver asks declaration that defendant State
has no claim for taxes, or, in alternative, that it is not a preferred creditor).
116 Bankers Trust Co. v. Greims, 11o Conn. 36, 147 At. 290 (1929) (executor
seeks declaration as to how much of the estate he must set aside by reason of hus-
band's election to take under statute in lieu of will) ; In re National Benefit Assui.
Co., Ltd., [1924] 2 Ch. 339 (receiver of insurance company seeks to establish extent
of claim of policyholders who have pledged their policies for advances. He fears
future claims against company, hence desires present protection by judgment);
Manley v. Sartori, [1927] 1 Ch. 157 (executor of one partner sues executor of
another to determine latter's rights in profits since dissolution of partnership by
death); In re Aschrott, Clifton v. Strauss. [X927] i Ch. 313 (administrator seeks
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In the celebrated case of Guaranty Trust Co. v. Hannay &
Co.," ' the plaintiffs brought an action for "a declaration that the
plaintiffs are not liable to repay to the defendants any sums paid
by them."
Actions in which the plaintiff debtor, in contract, quasi-contract,
or tort, seeks to limit his liability, whether or not he admits some
liability, are well known. In admiralty, after the injured person
has instituted an action, the shipowner may by statute in most
jurisdictions bring an independent action for the limitation of
liability. In England, it is common practice to bring actions for
a declaration that the plaintiff is not liable to the defendant be-
yond a certain sum '18 So, in Germany, a lessee brought an ac-
tion against his lessor for a declaration that his annual rent was
limited to a certain sum." 9
Instead of resorting to the somewhat cumbersome action of
interpleader, a debtor, receiver, or stakeholder, admittedly owing
money but not certain to whom to pay or distribute the fund in his
hands, may seek, by declaratory judgment against the conflicting
claimants, to determine who is the proper payee or distributee.
He is thereby protected against his own possible mistake in pay-
ing the wrong person, and he protects the payee against all claims
of the other creditors. The simplicity of such multipartite actions
is not the least of their advantages. The action may be brought
against a small number of named creditors,12 1 or, when brought by
declaration of amount of estate duty due from him on securities of German seized
partly in England, South Africa, and United States); In re Dominion Tar -&
Chemical Co., Ltd., [1929] 2 Ch. 387 (receiver sues preferred shareholders for
declaration whether he may deduct income tax before paying them dividends in
arrears).
117 [1915] 2 K. B. 536; cf. Prescott Ltd. v. Perpetual Trustee Co. (Ltd.),
28 N. S. W. 324 (1928).
I's The City of Edinburgh, [1921] P. 7o; The Vigilant, [1921] P. 322; The
Bristol City, [1921] P. 444; Donnelly v. Commissioner of Stamps, 33 N. Z.79
(1913) (plaintiff seeks declaration that he is liable only for a 5%, not a zo%, tax).
119 R. G. Z. 226, 18 (1929).
120 Snyder v. Taylor, 88 N. J. Eq. 513, 103 AtI. 396 (i9i8) (executor versus
.three legatees); In re Biedermann, Best v. Wertheim, [1922] 1 Ch. 32, [1922]
2 Ch. 77, (whether gift to Austrian was forfeited by Treaty of Peace Order and to
whom gift now belonged); In re Neuburger's Settlement, Foreshew v. Public
Trustee, [1923] r Ch. 508 (whether legacy payable to English wife of German or to
Custodian of Enemy Property); London & Lancashire Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fisher,
[1924] N. Z. 1286 (insured having died after bankruptcy, insurer seeks declaration
whether to pay personal representative -or official assignee).
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a receiver or stakeholder, against classes of creditors or claim-
ants,1) ' to determine either how to distribute among conflicting
groups a specific fund or to determine the particular rank or pref-
erence or priority of a given class of named claimants.' 2 The
danger incurred by a receiver who pays out funds without asking
the preliminary protection of a declaratory judgment or the in-
struction of the court is illustrated in In re Windsor Steam Coal'
Co., Ltd.,2 ' where the receiver was held liable personally for an
honest mistake in paying a claim to the wrong person. Lord Han-
worth remarked that the receiver had "the opportunity of safe-
guarding himself " and obtaining protection "by going to the
Court" for a declaration of his rights, and hence must bear the
responsibility of his mistake. The adjudication of his duty in
the premises enables the receiver to avoid the commission of a
tort against the other creditors.
Among cases involving the terms and conditions of repayment
of a debt, a debtor has sued for a declaration that he is privileged
to repay the debt, free from a claim for excessive interest, 24 or
that interest runs from a certain date only,1 25 or that the debtors
121 In re Welsh Hospital (Netley) Fund, Thomas v. Atty.-Gen., [1921] i Ch.
5S (whether surplus of wound-up hospital goes back to subscribers or is to be
applied cy pres); In re Madame Tussaud & Sons, Ltd., [1927] i Ch. 657 (how to
distribute surplus after liquidation of company. See also Collaroy Co., Ltd. v.
Giffard, [1928] i Ch. I44); First Garden City, Ltd. v. Bonham-Carter, [1928]
i Ch. 53 (corporation seeks against classes of shareholders to determine how surplus
is to be applied to arrears of cumulative dividends); Long Acre Press, Ltd. v.
Odham Press, Ltd., [1930] 2 Ch. i96 (correct allocation of a dividend among
defendant noteholders).
122 it re National Standard Life Assur. Corp., [x918] i Ch. 427 (receiver of
insurance company seeks to determine whether certain policyholders are entitled to
certain rank) ; In re Fraser & Chalmers, Ltd., [1919] 2 Ch. 114 (receiver seeks to
determine rights of preferred as against ordinary shareholders to surplus assets.
See also In re Springbok Agricultural Estates, Ltd., [1920] 1 Ch. 563) ; Dominion
Iron & Steel Co. v. Canadian Bank of Commerce, [1928] I D. L. R. 809 (secured
creditor having sold security and realized surplus, debtor sues to establish priority
among defendant creditors); Tasman Fruit-Packing Ass'n Ltd. v. The King, [1927]
N. Z. Si8 (whether defendant Crown as mortgage creditor entitled to priority over
other defendant creditor, assets being sufficient to pay only one) ; In re David A.
Hamilton & Co. Ltd., in liquidation, [1928] N. Z. 419 (rank of different types of
claims of defendant creditors).
123 [1929] i Ch. 151, i59.
124 Kruse v. Seeley, [1924] 1 Ch. 136. See also Brett v. Barr Smith. 26 C. L. R
87 (1919) (rate of interest due).
325 In re Agricultural Wholesale Society, Ltd., [1929] 2 Ch. 261.
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were privileged to repay in rubles rather than in sterling, and were
entitled thereupon to get back the bonds given as security." 6 The
last case was unusual in its facts, for the debtors, while prepared
to pay in rubles, preferred not to have the bonds back rather than
to pay in sterling, and yet wished the question of the medium of
payment to be determined without offering to redeem the pledge.
This unusual method of anticipatory relief divided the House of
Lords, but by a three to two decision they sustained the legitimacy,
of the proceeding. Lord Dunedin, casting the deciding vote, said:'
"It is obvious that it is a matter of real importance to the re-
spondents, as guiding their rule of conduct, to know whether the
loan is truly a rouble loan or a sterling loan. In the one case, they
will probably redeem; in the other case, they will not." 127
Non-Contractual Privileges
Privileges which the plaintiff claims and the defendant denies
are often derived not from contract, or from statute, but from the
common law. The attempt to exercise such privileges might, how-
ever, result in trespass or other tort, or in the loss of benefits which
would prove costly. To avoid such jeopardy, it is easier to bring.
the challenged privilege to the test, before attempt to exercise it,
by hailing into court the disputing defendant and thus securing
an authoritative adjudication upon the merits of the issue. And
this has frequently been done. Thus a challenged plaintiff has',
sought a judicial declaration of his privilege to nominate cler- -
ics, 28 to perform religious services in a certain burial ground, 2 '
to exclude members of other religious sects from the privilege of,
interment in a burial ground, 3 ' to enter a city hall as a reporter.
and have access to government offices at reasonable hours, 3 ' to
126 Russian Commercial and Industrial Bank v. British Bank for Foreign Trade,
Ltd., [1921] 2 A. C. 438.
127 Id. at 448. See also id. at 449.
128 Welch v. Bishop of Peterborough, 15 Q. B. D. 432 (1885).
129 Wood v. Burial Board of Headingley-Cum-Burley, [1892] I Q. B. 713; Cf.
13 Bombay 548, to officiate as a priest. Rao, Specific Relief Act, § 42, Madras,
1923, at 179.
130 Preston Corp. v. Pyke, [1929] 2 Ch. 338.
131 journal Printing Co. v. McVeity, [1915] 21 D.'L. R. 81. See also Hoskyns-
Abrahall v. Paignton Urban Council, [1928] 1 Ch. 67i (right of access to certai'
burial vaults).
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retain his office,' 3- to remove an employee from one department
to another. 3 '
Life-tenants or supposed life-tenants whose claims of privilege
are denied have occasionally sought judicial declarations of their
status and privileges as life-tenants,'34 of their power to sell a cer-
tain estate in the land "I or to mortgage or lease land '3 or to
direct the investment of capital.' The determination of these
issues in advance of action upon beliefs and assertions of power or
privilege saved many a costly mistake.
The beneficiary of a gift or legacy on condition, performance
of the condition being disputed by donor, executor, or trustee, and.
forfeiture threatened, may seek the protection of a judicial decla-
ration that the condition has been substantially performed, or that
by taking certain action he would perform it, or that its non-
performance is excusable. He thereby obtains a decision before
forfeiture can be invoked against him, and in the event that the
decision is adverse to his claim, he may still take such action as
may be necessary to avoid the threatened forfeiture. The dispute
as to the performance of the condition is placed in issue before
rather than after the foreclosure, and when it is still remediable. 8'
Many of these claims of privilege arise out of disputes relating
to land and the respective rights in land. Thus, a plaintiff has
claimed a declaration of his disputed privilege to erect and main-
132 Le Leu v. Commonwealth, 29 C. L. R. 3o5 (1921); Trower v. Common-
wealth, 32 C. L. R. 585 (1923), 34 id. 587 (1924).
133 Reichsarbeitergericht, R. A. G. 99 (X929), Bensheimer VII, x62.
34 In re Constable's Settled Estates, [19] i Ch. 178.
'35 In re Kariher's Petition, 284 Pa. 455, 131 Atl. 265 (1925) (plaintiff asserts
power of conveying title in fee, defendant that he is only a life tenant. Held, for
defendant) ; In re Knight's Settled Estates, [I918] i Ch. 211 (to sell certain estate
and transfer rent charges); In re Price, [1929] 2 Ch. 400 (wishing to sell, he seeks
declaration determining in whom title was vested).
3 18 In re Egerton Settled Estates, [1926] i Ch. 574 (privilege to mortgage in
certain way).
187 In re Gladwin's Trust, [1919] i Ch. 232.
188 Austen v. Collins, 54 L. T. R. 903 (1886) (plaintiff legatee who was required
to take a certain name and arms, could not obtain the arms, and seeks declaration
of substantial compliance with will and release from forfeiture. See also In re Cole,
[1939] i Ch. 218; In re Marshall, [1920] i Ch. 284) ; In re Wilkinson, [1926] i Ch.
842 (gift was to be terminated when beneficiary ceased to live in certain house.
After her marriage, she seeks declaration whether, if she went to live elsewhere
with her husband, she would forfeit gift).
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tain a boundary fence or gates on his land; ... to redeem land
sold for taxes; ... to buy in land, as a selling mortgagee; ... to enter
on defendant's property in order to remove buildings or fixtures
or to erect structures; ' to take property by eminent domain. 1
The action may take the form of a negative declaration of the
defendant's no-right to commit trespass,' to expropriate the
plaintiff's land,'45 to establish a burial ground near plaintiff's
land, 4 ' to permit his land to slide on the plaintiff's land, 14 7 to use
park land to widen a street.'48
Easements. Disputes arising out of continuing claims to the
enjoyment of easements, like continuing claims generally, are
peculiarly appropriate to determination by declaratory judgment.
Not infrequently the owner of the servient tenement initiates the
action to have it declared that the defendant has no easement over
the plaintiff's land as he claims '. or that the terms and conditions
of the easement are limited. 5'
19 Pettey v. Parsons, [I914] I Ch. 704, 2 Ch. 653 (to maintain gate and fence).
See also Siple v. Blow, 8 Ont. L. R. 547 (1904); Lewis v. Wakeling, 54 Ont. L. R.
647 (I923).
140 Standard Trust Co. v. Municipality of Stewart, 24 Alberta 56 (1929).
141 Loyal Marlborough Lodge v. Rogers, 29 N. Z. 141 (1910).
142 East Riding of Yorkshire County Council v. Proprietors of Selby Bridge,
[1925] i Ch. 841 (plaintiff, wishing to erect school on land approaching bridge,
claims right of access); Pukuweka Sawmills, Ltd. v. Winger, [1917] N. Z. 81
(plaintiff, who had built tramway on defendant's land, claims privilege to re-
move it).
143 In re Bradford City Premises, [1928] i Ch. 138 (right to take "an open
space of land ").
144 Levesque v. Spargo, [1921] N. Z. IOI9 (no right to enter on plaintiff's
land and cut trees. Dispute as to boundary fence).
145 Jackson v. Knutsford Urban Dist. Council, [1914] 2 Ch. 686.
140 Clegg v. Metcalfe, [1914] i Ch. 8o8.
'47 Kennard v. Cory Bros. & Co., Ltd., [i2i] A. C. 521, [1922] 1 Ch. 265.
148 Attorney-General v. Sunderland Corp., [1929] 2 Ch. 436.
149 Colorado & Utah Coal Co. v. Walter, 75 Colo. 489, 226 Pac. 864 (1924)
(defendant's no-right to a spring on or to cross plaintiff's land. See also Hans-
ford v. Jago, [1921] 1 Ch. 322; Siple v. Blow, 8 Ont. L. R. 547 (19o4); Reach v.
Crosland, 43 Ont. L. R. 209 (1918)); Vogeler v. Alwyn Improvement Corp., 247
N. Y. 131, 159 N. E. 886 (1928) (plaintiff's freedom from defendant's alleged
easement-denied); Long v. Gowlett, [1923] 2 Ch. 177 (no right to pass over
plaintiff's part of river); Stevens v. National Mut. Life Ass'n, 32 N. Z. 114o
(1913) (defendant's no-right to easement of light [denied]).
15 Kowalski v. Mather, 112 Conn. 594, 153 Atl. 168 (1931) (term of defend-
ant's easement under grantor's reservation in deed, twenty years, life, or per-
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On the other hand, the alleged owner of an easement may claim
a declaration of the existence of his easement and of the defend-
ant servient tenant's no-right to interfere with its enjoyment." 1
Inasmuch as these are continuing claims the denial of which
readily arouses passions, both trespass and possible breach of the
peace are avoided by the opportunity to seek a judicial declaration
of rights as an alternative to violent assertion and resistance.
Privileges and Immunities as Against the Government
With the ever-greater interference by government in the affairs
of private individuals, it often becomes important to the individual
to test the validity of the interference, present or proposed, before
it is applied or invoked against him. Statute, ordinance, or ad-
ministrative regulation, with or without penalties for disobedience,
may seriously impair individual freedom of action. In both
England and the United States, where the remedy of injunction is
subject to conditions and limitations of various kinds,5 ' the de-
claratory judgment has become a convenient method of testing
the propriety, validity, or constitutionality of administrative ac-
petuity. Held, life); Barber v. Mayor of Petone, 28 N. Z. 6og (i9og) (whether
plaintiff is bound to let defendant enter for purposes of repair).
151. Litchfield-Speer v. Queen Anne's Gate Syndicate, [199] i Ch. 407 (no-
right to interfere with plaintiff's light); Westwood v. Heywood, [1921] 2 Ch.
130 (defendant landowner's no-right to cut off plaintiff's water supply) ; Sack v.
Jones, [1925] 1 Ch. 235 (declaration of servient tenant's duty to furnish lateral
support); Gregg v. Richards, [1926] 1 Ch. 102 (vendee sues vendor to establish
existence of right of way).
152 In addition to the equitable limitations upon injunctions, the issuance of
a preliminary injunction is subject to financial burdens. The court may require
conditions, such as the promise to pay all the damages suffered by the defendant
in case the injunction is finally denied or it may require a bond or a deposit to
secure the defendant against injury. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles,
192 Fed, oo9 (C. C. S. D. Cal. 19io) (impounding of rates collected in excess of
ordinance and bond); City of Amarillo v. Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co., 253 Fed.
638 (C. C. A. 5th, 19I8) (rate case, bond to protect subscribers and a deposit
paid into court for the same purpose); Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship
Clerks v. Pennsylvania R. R., 296 Fed. 218 (E. D. Pa. 1922) (changes in wage
scale, bond required) ; HIGH, INJtUNcIoNs (4th ed. i9o5) §§ 1619-34a. See also
Caldwell, Injunctions Against Crime (193i) 26 ILL. L. Rav. 259; Dunbar, Gov-
ernment by Injunction (1897) 13 L. Q. REV. 347; Frankfurter and Greene, Labor
Injunctions and Federal Legislation (1929) 42 HARV. L. Rv. 766; Lewis, A Protest
Against Administering Criminal Law by Injunction (1894) 33 Am. L. REG. (N s.).
879.
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tion. As a rule, the mere enactment of a statute or ordinance im-
posing restraints on an individual and implying enforcement by
prosecuting officials threatens and hampers the plaintiff's freedom,
peace of mind or interest, and creates that justiciability of the
issue which sustains a proceeding for an injunction and, a fortiori,
for a declaratory judgment. 5 '
In some cases, however, a more definite threat of administrative
action may be necessary to create justiciability. But in either
case, it can hardly be supposed that a government official, the
legality of whose act is challenged, requires more than a decision
on the disputed question of law, and that injunction to restrain or
mandamus to command him is anything more than a mere for-
mality. The decision, not the coercive order, settles the dispute.
The idea that it is necessary for one branch of the government
forcibly to restrain or punish another branch or instrument of
the government, in order to achieve respect for the declared law,
is anomalous.'54 The simplest way is the best way to bring to
judicial determination the challenged validity of governmental
action allegedly violating individual rights; and experience has
shown that the declaratory judgment serves that purpose ad-
mirably. The disadvantage of not having available such form of
procedure and relief is illustrated in such cases as Shredded Wheat
Co. v. City of Elgin,5 ' where the plaintiff sought to enjoin as un-
constitutional the enforcement of a municipal ordinance which
required it under penalty to pay a heavy license tax as a condition
of selling in the city a product coming into the city in interstate
commerce. The court refused to pass upon the ordinance uitil
153 Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197 (1923) (Said Butler, J., for the Su-
preme Court, id. at 216: "They are not obliged to take the risk of prosecution, fines
and imprisonment and loss of property in order to secure an adjudication of their
rights "); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 5io (1925); Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926).
154 Hughes, C. J., in Stratton v. St. Louis S. W. Ry., 282 U. S. 10, i8 (1930):
"It is not necessary, however, that formal application should be made for such
a writ [mandamus], as the District Judge may now proceed to take the action,
which the writ, if issued, would require."
..So the German Supreme Court: "In the case of the State as defendant the
distinction between a declaratory and an executory action is merely a formal
one." R. G. Z. March 30, 1931, Jur. Wochenschr. v. 6o, at 2483; R. G. Z. May 18,
1931, at.3263.
1 5 284 Ill. 389, 120 N. E. 248 (x918).
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the plaintiff had purported to violate it by selling its product with-
out paying the tax and until a prosecution for the penalty had
been begun. If invalid, said the court, the prosecution would fail
and the plaintiff would not be injured; if valid, there was no
ground on which its enforcement should be enjoined. To deter-
mine whether the law is a trap, whether the offering is mushroom or
toadstool, the bait must first be eaten! So Dreiser was unable to
obtain a determination against his publishers, the John Lane Co.,
whether "the Genius" violated the criminal law, until the pub-
lishers had actually issued the book, something they declined to do
in the face of a possible criminal penalty.15
The development of the declaratory judgment in actions
against the government to place in issue the validity of adminis-
trative action has been a matter of slow growth. It had to make
its way in England against the older view that a petition of right
was the proper means of challenging the validity of governmental
action. But necessity created distinctions. In the famous case
of Dyson v. Attorney General,5 ' Dyson asked a- declaratory
judgment that certain forms issued by the tax authorities and
requiring under penalty detailed information as to his property and
business were illegal and unauthorized. Over the protests of the
attorney general that the proceeding should have been brought by
petition of right, the Court of Appeal held that the declaration
was proper to test the validity of administrative action and that
the petition of right was confined to the demanded conveyance of
property or money claims against the Crown. Cozens-Hardy on
the Chancery side added: "It is no light matter for the Commis-
sioners to issue broadcast forms which purport to impose obliga-
tions which do not exist and which add a threat of a penalty in
case of non-compliance. A general declaration is pre-eminently
desirable in these circumstances." 158
Lord Justice Farwell remarked in this case: " It would be a
blot on our system of law and procedure if there is no way by
which a decision on the true limit of the power of inquisition vested
in the Commissioners can be obtained by any member of the
156 183 App. Div. 773, i1 N. Y. Supp. 605 (1918).
.57 [J9II] i K. B. 410, [1912] 1 Ch. 158. See also remarks of Warring-
ton, L. J., in Burghes v. Attorney General, [IgI] 2 Ch. 139, i56, [X912] x Ch.
173. 158 [1912] I Ch. I58, 166.
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public aggrieved, without putting himself in the invidious posi-
tion of being sued for a penalty." '
It often becomes useful to ask for both a declaration and an
injunction; the fear of forfeiting or jeopardizing threatened rights
may warrant both. The special value of the declaration lies in the
fact that it may be issued and may conclusively determine the
rights of the parties, notwithstanding the fact that an injunction
may for some technical or practical reason be refused. 6
A case somewhat similar to the Dyson case occurred in Australia,
where the court issued a declaration that a certain statute -
under which a Royal Commission had under heavy penalty for
refusal to answer, asked certain questions and required certain
documents as to the operation of the plaintiff's sugar business -
was partly invalid. The court said:
"In my opinion the jurisdiction of the Court both to make a declara-
tion of right and to grant an injunction is clearly established in any
of the following cases: (i) If the Act itself under which the alleged
power is claimed is wholly invalid; (2) If the Government instrumen-
tality is attempting to exert under cover of a valid Act powers which are
not capable of being conferred on it by the Commonwealth Parliament;
or (3) If it is attempting to exert under cover of the instrument creat-
ing it, powers which that instrument does not confer." 161
Freedom from any governmental requirement which is believed
unlawfully to impair the privileges of the individual may likewise
be judicially asked in the form of a suit for a declaration of im-
munity."' The plaintiff thus takes the initiative in putting to the
159 [1911] 1 K. B. 410, 421.
160 Erwin Billiard Parlor v. Buckner, Sheriff, 156 Tenn. 278, 300 S. W. 565
(1927); Evans v. Manchester, Sheffield & Lincolnshire Ry., 36 Ch. D. 626 (1887);
London Ass'n of Shipowners v. London & India Docks, [1892] 3 Ch. 242;
Attorney-General v. Merthyr Tydfil Union, [igoo] i Ch. 516; Deep Creek Gold
Dredging Co. v. Gympie Quartz Crushing Battery Co., 8 Queensland L. J. 13X
(1897).
161 Colonial Sugar Refining Co., Ltd. v. Attorney General, 15 C. L. R. 182
(1912). Isaacs and Higgins, JJ., dissenting, considered that there was no threat
to enforce penalties and that the questions had not yet been asked (pp. 222, 226),
hence that the issue was not yet justiciable.
162 Criminal liability: Little v. Smith, 124 Kan. 237, 257 Pac. 959 (1927)
(privilege to carry cigarette advertisements without penalty); Path6 Exchange,
Inc. v. Cobb, 202 App. Div. 450, 195 N. Y. Supp. 66i (1922), aff'd, 236 N. Y.
539, 143 N. E. 274 (1923) (that plaintiff's "news reel" was not subject to cen-
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test a governmental action which threatens him with restrictions
and often with a criminal prosecution. One of the commonest
forms of this type of action is the claim of immunity from the re-
quirement of a license or fee as a condition of doing business. 6 '
sorship); Utah State Fair Ass'n v. Green, 68 Utah 251, 249 Pac. ioi6 (1926)
(privileged to conduct horse racing without danger of prosecution).
Validity of statutory or administrative regulations: (i) Building regulations:
Faulkner v. City of Keene, 155 Atl. 195 (N. H. 1931) (privilege to establish a
filling station in building zone); Rosenberg v. Whitefish Bay, x99 Wis. 214, 225
N. W. 838 (X929) (that statute prohibiting building does not apply to plaintiff);
Todd & Higginbotham v. Burnett, 16 D. 794, 26 J. 374 (Scot. x854) (that plain-
tiff's already built factory was not subject to building restrictions). (2) Other
regulations concerning land: Spring Hill Cemetery Co. v. Lindsey, 37 S. W.(2d)
iii (Tenn. 1931) (that burdens imposed for beautification could not be imposed
on plaintiff because statute unconstitutional). (3) Business free from regula-
tions: Jewell Tobacco Warehouse Co. v. Kemper, 2o6 Ky. 667, 268 S. W. 342
(1925) (unsustained claim that statute regulating business of warehousemen was
unconstitutional); Dowdy v. City of Covington, 237 Ky. 274, 35 S. W.(2d) 304
(1931) (administrative interpretation of ordinance requiring registration of mov-
ing van operators, held improper); Erwin Billiard Parlor v. Buckner, 156 Tenn.
278, 300 S. W. 565 (1927) (not subject to pool-room regulations, because dis-
criminatory); Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Co. v. The King, [Igor]
2 K. B. 686 (shipping company claims exemption from statutory duty to provide
certain accommodations for lascars) ; W. & A. McArthur, Ltd. v. State of Queens-
land, 28 C. L. R. 530 (1920) (that anti-profiteering statute did not apply to plain-
tiff's goods); Carleton v. Coady, [1924] 1 Ir. R. i68 (plaintiff's land exempt
from rent-fixing statute). (4) Administrative notices and returns: Flint v.
Attorney-General, [1918] i Ch. 216, [i918] 2 Ch. 5o (notice of compulsory
military service); Smeeton v. Attorney-General, [1920] i Ch. 85 (exempt from
filling out tax return); Whyte, Ridsdale & Co. Ltd. v. Attorney-General, [1927]
x Ch. 548 (notice that artists' supplies were importable only under license claimed
ultra vires); R. G. Z. 36, 210 (1895) (no tax return demandable because in-
heritance exempt).
Liberty to act: (i) Plaintiff's privilege: Second Nat. Bank of Nashua v. Old
Guaranty Savings Bank, 84 N. H. 342, 15o Ati. 737 (1930) (privileged to liqui-
date assets of defendant bank and surrender charter); Northwestern Nat. Ins.
Co. v. Freedy, 227 N. W. 952 (Wis. 1929) (privileged to organize casualty com-
pany notwithstanding charter); Gillow v. Durham County Council, [191x] i K. B.
222 (that plaintiff school managers are privileged, without interference from edu-
cation authorities, to have school cleaned and charge expense to local authority).
(2) Defendant's no-right: Genders v. London County Council, [1915] 1 Ch. i
(that not part, but only whole, could be taken under eminent domain); Hillman
v. Commonwealth, 35 C. L. R. 26o (1924) (that defendant had no right to employ
for more than 44 hours per week without pay for overtime); Boland v. Canadian
Nat. Ry., 56 Ont. L. R. 653 (1925) (that defendant had no right to expropriate
plaintiff's land).
163 American Trust Co. v. McCallister, 299 Pac. 319 (Ore. 193) (privileged
to sell stock without public permit); James v. Commonwealth, 41 C. L. R. 442
(1928) (plaintiff immune from Government's export license on dried fruits);
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In the United States this generally involves the issue of consti-
tutionality, and numerous cases in our states attest the growing
practice of challenging the validity of statutes or ordinances im-
posing duties on the individual under the police power by declara-
tory judgment, instead of by the more cumbersome injunction,
which, although accomplishing the same purpose of deciding the
issue, is nevertheless conditioned upon the assumption of pro-
cedural and substantive burdens. The declaration achieves the
identical result while avoiding the difficulties attached to the
injunction.
In a Pennsylvania case, an owner of land successfully challenged
the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance which, by drawing arbi-
trary lines, materially impaired the value of his land by confining
it to residential purposes, thereby interfering with the execution
of a pending contract for its sale. The supreme court of Pennsyl-
vania, in holding the ordinance unconstitutional, relied upon Sec-
tion 2 of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, which provides
that " any person . . . whose rights . . . are affected by a stat-
ute [or] municipal ordinance . . . may have determined any
question of construction or validity arising under the . . . stat-
ute [or] ordinance . . . and obtain a declaration of rights, status,
or other legal relations thereunder." '"
Much has been heard lately of efforts to bring about a consoli-
dation and merger of competing businesses, a practice believed by
the promotors to be economically sound and legally privileged, yet
which encounters the hazard of possible criminal penalties and
dissolution proceedings under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Busi-
ness wishes to obey the law generally, but can not obtain any
authoritative determination of its interpretation in a particular
case until the merger has been actually effected and then only by
Lawson v. Interior Fruit Committee, 42 Br. Col. 493 (1930) (license); Western
Australian Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Attorney General, [1926] Ir. R. 57 (plaintiff im-
mune from Government's demand of fresh deposit for doing business); Ham-
burgisches Oberverwaltungsgericht I, No. 49, cited in LAssAR, REIC SHVERWAL-
TUNGSGERICHT (1930) 34 (that dentist is not subject to statutory permission to
use gold and platinum).
164 Taylor v. Haverford Township, 299 Pa. 402, 149 Atl. 639 (1930); cf.
Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U. S. o5 (1928) (statute requiring ownership of,
drugstores by pharmacists held invalid on injunction) with Evans v. Baldrige,
294 Pa. 142, 144 AUt. 97 (1928), and Pratter v. Lascoff, 140 Misc. 211, 249 N. Y.
Supp. 211 (193I) (declaratory judgment).
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being made the object of a prosecution. It is not possible then to
unscramble the merged properties without serious losses, and the
perpetual sword of Damocles is a deterrent to enterprise. The
dilemma has induced legislative proposals that the Federal Trade
Commission shall be enabled to give an advisory opinion on the
validity of a proposed merger, thus presumably giving some meas-
ure of assurance against federal prosecution. The suggestion has
manifest weaknesses. In foreign countries having the declaratory
judgment procedure, it is not uncommon for a plaintiff thus in
danger and dilemma to institute an action against the attorney
general or enforcing official by originating summons operating as
an order to show cause and to claim that his presently proposed
action is privileged under the statute. Three cases in New Zea-
land may be cited. Section 3 of the New Zealand Declaratory
Judgment Act provides: "Where any person desires to do any act
the . . . legality . . . of which depends on the construction . . .
of any statute . . . such person may apply to the Supreme Court
by originating summons . . . for a declaratory order determining
any question as to the construction . . . of such statute." In
Smith v. Kairanga County,16 the plaintiff owned land which he
wished to supply with water. Joining with others having the same
desire, he presented to the administration a scheme for the con-
struction of an irrigation district, together with the necessary
works. The scheme required the use of iron pipes, however, which
was, of doubtful legality; but the court sustained the plaintiff's
claim for a declaration that such use would not violate the statute.
In Australian Mut. Provident Soc. v. Attorney General,'66 the
company proposed to issue to parents insurance policies on the
lives of children which the company believed, contrary to the at-
torney general, to be within the restrictive terms of the Life
Insurance Act, 19o8, which closely limited such policies. On an
action for a declaration of validity, the court held that while two
of the statutory conditions had been met, the third had not, and
that hence the policy was illegal. In Harcourt v. Attorney-
General,'67 certain racing clubs desired to inaugurate a new scheme
165 [1917] N. Z. 567.
166 [1916] N. Z. 179. See also Scales v. Registrar of Companies, [192o] N. Z.
821 (company held entitled to registration, but bound to increase capital before
commencing insurance business). 167 [1923] N. Z. 686.
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for conducting races, inasmuch as they had found the old one
productive of accidents. They desired to run off heats, with a
prize for each heat, but there was to be no final competition be-
tween the respective winners. As racing was an important indus-
try and sport in New Zealand, the clubs sought the protection of
a decision before risking a violation of the criminal law. They
thereupon sued the attorney general for a declaration that their
proposed scheme was lawful under the Gaming Act. The court
decided that part of the plan was legal and another part illegal,
remarking: "The Declaratory Judgments Act . . . is a statute
which authorizes His Majesty's subjects to ascertain by an au-
thoritative pronouncement the precise meaning of the law they are
called upon to obey." 18
If, then, a plan of merger is laid before the attorney general and
he indicates disapproval, why should it not be possible for the
parties in interest to cite him into court to have the issue of le-
gality determined before a possibly mistaken course has been
pursued with the resulting expense, loss, and liability to criminal
penalty? The suggestion that a dishonest attorney general might
connive at a violation of the law is as appropriate to the present
statute, which enables him to determine the policy of prosecution.
The only objection that occurs to the writer is that the merger
plan as presented may not be the plan as carried into execution;
but that will simply mean that the old decision is no bar to a new
prosecution. If the cards are changed, the deal breaks down.
But the usual attack is upon the contract of merger itself, and the
validity of that can be passed upon as easily before the merger
is concluded as after. The advantage of an authoritative binding
judgment of a court over the advisory opinion of the Federal
Trade Commission requires no comment.
One of the most common claims of immunity is the immunity
from taxation. It is often difficult to challenge the validity of a
tax by injunction, and it is hazardous to invite a levy or await en-
forcement proceedings, with possible penalties. A practice has
therefore developed of challenging the validity of a tax law or of
an assessment thereunder by an action for a declaration, a speedy
method of determination which does not materially hamper the
168 [1923] N. Z. 69o.
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taxing power and which insures an authoritative determination on
the propriety of the proposed exaction before it has been enforced.
This proceeding may take the form of an attack upon the consti-
tutionality or validity of the law," 9 or upon the validity of the
assessment thereunder; ... or the taxpayer may contend that he "I'
or his property172 is exempt from taxation, or that the amount of
the tax is unduly high or the classification improper.'
Privileges of Governmental Authorities
The dangers to which an officer is exposed either in refusing to
carry out a statute which he believes unconstitutional or in carry-
ing out a statute which later proves to have been unconstitutional
are extraordinary." 4 For refusing to act, the officer exposes him-
169 Frazier v. City of Chattanooga, 156 Tenn. 346, i S. W.(2d) 786 (1928)
(claim that law permitting assessment on property owners for improvements was
repealed; denied); Universal Film Mfg. Co. v. New South Wales, 40 C. L. R. 333
(1927); Mason v. City of Victoria, 26 Br. Col. 418 (1917).
170 Wilcox v. Madison, io6 Conn. 223, 137 AtI. 742 (1927) (assessment claimed
out of proportion to real value of property and that classification wrong. Denied.
Certiorari denied, 276 U. S. 606 (1927)); Soergel, Jahrbuch d. Verwaltungsr. II,
499 (Baden, March 23, 19o9) (plaintiff could seek declaration against preliminary
order on rate of assessment, without waiting for determination of taxable res
[working capital]).
171 Parmer v. Lindsey, 157 Tenn. 29, 3 S. W.(2d) 657 (1928) (plaintiffs
claim immunity from privilege tax, not being "general contractors"); Nash
Sales, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 198 Wis. 281, 224 N. W. 127 (1929) (interstate
motor companies shipping in original packages claim exemption from state tax);
Vaughn v. Attorney General, 2o Alberta 424 (1924) (that plaintiff's deceased
husband held vendor's deed in escrow only, hence not owner, and exempt).
172 City of Louisville v. Cromwell, State Treas., 233 Ky. 828, 27 S. W.(2d) 377
(1930) (city claims exemption on gasoline to be used in city vehicles); Peoples
Tel. Corp. v. City of Butler, 99 Pa. Sup. Ct. 256 (2930) (that lot and building
necessary for plaintiff's business, hence tax exempt); Automatic Totalisators Ltd.
v. Federal Comm. of Taxation, 27 C. L. R. 513 (2920) (dividends not cash prize
in lottery, hence exempt); Macrae Mining Co., Ltd. v. Township of Bucke, 58 Ont.
L. R. 453 (1926) (that mining rights not merged with sold surface rights, hence
exempt from tax on sale).
173 Cupp Grocery Co. v. Johnstown, 288 Pa. 43, 135 Atl. 61o (1927) (plaintiff
owner of 33 stores claims liability to only one license tax of $zoo as a corporation,
not $9I5 as assessed); Incorporated Council of Law Reporting v. Federal Comm.
of Taxation, 34 C. L. R. 580 (2924) (whether plaintiff liable as a person or cor-
poration).
174 See Norwood v. Goldsmith, 168 Ala. 224, 53 So. 84 (igio), where the treas-
urer of a county refused to pay a warrant that had been drawn for the repayment
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self to an action for tort at the behest of a citizen prejudiced or to
removal from office, fine, or greater penalty; for acting, he may
expose himself to an action for damages or to disciplinary meas-
ures. He usually assumes the risks of constitutionality. For taxes
collected under an invalid act, the tax collector is personally lia-
ble, whether the money has been paid into the state treasury or
not; for the destruction of property or interference with personal
liberty, he is also personally liable; in executing process under an
unconstitutional statute, many states hold him liable. 5 On writ
of mandamus, many states deny the officer the privilege of setting
up the unconstitutionality of the governing statute as a defense.
The unhappy dilemma of officers who must stake their security
and imperil their positions by having to guess upon the constitu-
tionality or unconstitutionality of the statute under which they
are required to act is described by the Alabama Supreme Court in
the case of Norwood v. Goldsmith:
"All persons or officers are of necessity required to pass upon the
validity of all acts or proposed statutes under which they are required
to act or to decline to act. In so acting or declining to act under such
proposed statute he must necessarily pass upon it for himself. He may
do so with or without advice from attorneys or other sources of informa-
tion. But courts are the one source from which he can get no infor-
mation in advance, as to whether he should, in any particular instance,
observe or decline to observe the requirements of the proposed act or
statute. Every executive officer, or every person as for that matter,
is presumed to know the law - a presumption often violent but always
necessary. Hence every man is his own constructionist. If two differ
as to the construction of a given act, and it is acted upon or declined
to be acted upon by the one, to the hurt or injury of the other, and the
one is sued in the courts by the other for so acting or declining to act,
of taxes paid under an alleged unconstitutional statute, which the treasurer thought
constitutional.
'.7 See discussion of the cases in Field, The Effect of an Unconstitutional Statute
in the Law of Public Officers: Liability of Officer for Action or Nonaction (1928)
77 U. oF PA. L. REv. i55; Crocker, The Tort Liability of Public Officers Who Act
Under Unconstitutional Statutes (1929) 2 So. CATir. L. REV. 236.
176 State ex rel. Mueller v. Thompson, "49 Wis. 488, i37 N. W. 20 (1912); Cf.
Golden Gate Bridge and Highway Dist. v. Felt, 5 Pac.(2d) 585 (Cal. 1931); Board
of Comm'rs of Newton County v. State, 161 Ind. 616, 69 N. E. 442 (2904). See
the cases pro and con in Rapacz, Protection of Officers Who Act Under Unconstitu-
tional Statutes (1927) 311 Mns. L. Rtv. 585.
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and in the decision of the cause it becomes necessary to pass upon the
validity of the act in order to determine the rights of the parties in
that suit, the court will then - but not until then - pass upon the con-
stitutionality of the act; and it is then only passed upon by the court
in so far as the rights of these particular parties to the particular suit
are concerned. When so decided by the highest court of the land all
people, including executive and judicial officers, ought and usually do
consider that particular question as settled and binding; but this is
only so by the rules of policy, propriety, and common consent, and the
credence which the people have in the opinions of such courts." ' 77
The question arises whether the issue of constitutionality, often
the only issue in the case, can not be decided at the request of the
officer, when time permits, before he undertakes to act, rather
than after, with all its attendant risks of loss, penalty, and dis-
missal. Even those courts which protect the officer against mis-
taken action under a warrant allegedly fair on its face, simply
throw on the unfortunate victim of the officer's act the risks and
consequences of the mistake. Either party -the officer or the
citizen to be affected - should have the opportunity to place in
issue the question of constitutionality as soon as the dispute arises.
Thus, the light is turned on before rather than after the perhaps
fatal leap, which need no longer be made in the dark.
The experience of many jurisdictions with the declaratory judg-
ment shows that it has been frequently employed for the purpose
of obtaining a decision on the challenged power of an officer or
administrative body under a statute. The issue generally involves
either the constitutionality or construction of a statute or ordi-
nance. To enable this question of construction to be determined
before the officer acts, is manifestly a public service to every one
concerned. Contrast with the case of Norwood v. Goldsmith '178
the case of Graham v. Englandy19 where the comptroller of the
state, not knowing whether to pay the salary to a judge whose
term had expired but who claimed to hold over during his contest
of the election resulting in his apparent defeat, or to a temporary
judge appointed by the governor during the pendency of the elec-
177 Supra note 72, at 234-35, 53 So. at 87.
178 Ibid.
179 154 Tenn. 435, 288 S. W. 728 (1926); see also State ex rel. Barham v.
Graham, iSI Tenn. 557, 30 S. W.(2d) 274 (193o).
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tion contest, or to the newly elected judge, a decision which de-
pended on the validity of the statute authorizing the appointment
of a temporary judge, brought an action for a declaration of his
privilege to pay the salary to Judge England, the temporary judge,
and also to Judge Barham, the defeated judge. By deciding that
the comptroller was authorized to pay the temporary judge and
the newly elected judge only, they protected the comptroller
against an erroneous payment, and determined the constitutional
issue.
Tax collectors, before applying drastic sanctions subjecting
themselves to penalty if wrong, may seek the aid of a declaratory
judgment against the delinquent taxpayer who challenges the le-
gality of the proposed sanction. Thus, before arresting a taxpayer
for non-payment of a school tax, no property having been found,
a Pennsylvania collector whose right to levy or arrest had been
contested on the ground that the school tax was illegal, sought a
declaration that the tax, the levy, and the arrest were legal and
that the defendant was subject to them. 8 ' In a New Zealand
case, a registrar of property had sold for taxes two lots out of
many belonging to the same delinquent taxpayer, but mortgaged
to different mortgagees. Although he had realized sufficient funds
for the tax from the sale of the two lots, the registrar desired to
make further sales in order not to compel two mortgagees to con-
tribute the whole fund. The owner objecting to further sales and
the purchasers demanding title, the registrar sought and obtained
a declaration of his powers under the statute, thus avoiding trouble
from many directions.' Officers occasionally wish to alter public
records or instruments, but doubt their power and fear the con-
sequences of thus modifying vested rights, seeking, instead, the
advance protection of a declaratory judgment against the affected
citizens. 2
Disputes often arise as to the term of office or legal status of
180 Huber, Tax Collector v. Weakland, 7 D. & C. 496 (Pa. 1925).
181 Mitchell v. Hayes et al., [1926] N. Z. 262.
182 Mayor, etc., of Karori v. Australian Mut. Provident Society, 3o N. Z. 438
(igii) (power to change form of debenture bonds of loan authorized to construct
public works. Statute construed); District of Land Registrar v. Thompson, [1922]
N. Z. 627 (power to recognize title of good faith grantee of a certificate of title,
grantor's name having been forged by his son, and to compel delivery of certificate
for rectification of register).
JUDICIAL RELIEF FOR PERIL AND INSECURITY 851
an elected or appointed officer. Doubt as to the length of the term
creates uncertainty not merely for the officer, but for the commu-
nity and for the administration. Thus, in Philadelphia, one Fox
was appointed district attorney upon the resignation of the incum-
bent. Ross, a taxpayer, sued out mandamus to have a district at-
torney elected at the next general election, whereupon Fox success-
fully brought an action for a declaration that his term ran until
the expiration of the term of his predecessor, a difference of a
year. 3 The fact that mandamus had been filed did not bar the
action for a declaration. Judge Wingate was elected surrogate
of Kings County, New York, in i925. At the same election a
constitutional amendment was ratified, which increased the surro-
gate's term from 6 to 14 years. Whether this amendment applied
to surrogates chosen at that election was doubtful, so early in 1931
Surrogate Wingate sued the secretary of state, who lists officers
open for election, for a declaration that his term of office ran for
14 years from 1925. In holding that there was an actual contro-
versy, and that the plaintiff's term ran for only six years, the court
held that "future confusion and possible litigation will be
avoided by a present determination of the question here involved.
Public officers should have the right to have their legal duties
judicially determined. In this way only can the disastrous results
of well-intentioned but illegal acts be avoided with certainty." 8 4
Whether a state sheriff may under the Pennsylvania constitution
accept appointment as a federal prohibition officer 185 or whether
under a Kansas statute an employee of a railroad operating under
a city franchise may hold office as an elected city commissioner 18'
has been decided by declaratory judgment, thus avoiding trans-
gressions of the constitution or criminal penalties.
Cities and administrative boards doubtful of their powers to
undertake official action affecting private rights have often found
183 Fox, Dist. Atty. v. Ross et al., 7 D. & C. 263 (Pa. 1926).
184 Wingate v. Flynn, 139 Misc. 779, 249 N. Y. Supp. 35I (1931).
185 Sterrett's Petition, 9 D. & C. 430 (Pa. 1926). It is doubtful who contested
the petition. If there was no contestant, no declaration should have been issued, for
it was then only an advisory opinion.
186 State ex rel. Hopkins v. Grove, io9 Kan. 619, 201 Pac. 82 (1921). The suc-
cessful action for a declaration of ineligibility was brought by the Attorney Gen-
eral after Grove's election but before Grove took office, thus saving a criminal
penalty.
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it of advantage to secure an authoritative determination of their
powers against challengers, announced or notified, thus saving
unfortunate and expensive mistakes in the conduct of public busi-
ness. These actions, involving questions of statutory construc-
tion, may be brought against contesting public officials, against
the citizen directly affected by the proposed administrative act,
or even against a challenging taxpayer.
Many of these questions arise in connection with the proper
expenditure of public moneys, including the validity of resulting
bond issues. The power to raise loans for certain purposes or
under certain circumstances, especially in view of provisions for
municipal debt limits, is often put to the test in this way."'
Naturally, in these cases, the public act in question must be ac-
complished or imminent, and not merely remotely prospective or
contingent. The legal propriety of spending lawfully borrowed
money for specific purposes may also be determined by declara-
tion. Thus, in a New Zealand case borrowed funds were found
insufficient for all of the eight purposes for which expendi-
ture had been voted at an election, whereupon the city council
wisely sought the protection of a declaratory judgment before
expending the funds for some only of the designated purposes,
for it was held that they were strictly bound by the vote.'
The power to administer a loan fund ... or to change the
terms of an authorized loan has also been adjudicated by decla-
ration."'
The question whether the issuance of improvement bonds based
on assessments on abutting landowners was incurring or increas-
ing indebtedness within the meaning of a statute requiring the
187 Tauranga Borough v. Bank of New Zealand, [1916 ] N. Z. 233; Napier
Borough v. Australian Mut. Provident Soc., [1917] N. Z. 292 (involved question
whether borrowing power exceeded); Hauraki Drainage Board v. Bank of New
Zealand, [1928] N. Z. 59 (board, having merged two drainage districts, asserts
power to carry on separate projects by raising loan).
188 In re Wanganui Borough Council Tramways Extension Special Loan, [1922]
N. Z. 5oo.
189 Mayor of Wellington v. Attorney General, 32 N. Z. 1175 (1913) (whether
interest earned on loan fund was part of capital or usable for interest and service
charges on loan).
190 Gisborne Borough v. Auckland Prov. Patriotic and War Relief Ass'n, [I916]
N. Z. 218 (whether, after getting authority for thirty-year loan, plaintiff could
contract for ten-year loan, on which lender insisted).
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approval of a mayor was raised by declaration in Pennsylvania.
The court in this case said:
"The legal relations of the parties hereto under the Statute of 1927,
supra, are disputed, and under the Act of 1923, supra, any person in-
terested may obtain a declaration of his rights, status or other legal
relations thereunder. A mayor who is advised by his lawfully con-
stituted legal adviser and who, therefore, firmly believes that the act
does not apply and that it is not his duty or right to certify, stands
in a dangerous position if his adviser and he are wrong. . : . We do not
concur in the view that the prayer is purely for an advisory opinion; it is
for more; it is, we think, for the speedy determination of a real contro-
versy as to whether or not these improvement bonds come under the
provisions of the said Act of 1927 and its supplement." 1
In a Kentucky case, a city had contracted with the defend-
ant for the construction of a water system and its bonds had been
authorized. The legislature then passed an act which threw
doubt upon the validity of the contract and of the proposed bonds,
a doubt which was dissipated by a declaratory judgment that
the subsequent act did not prevent the issuance of the bonds
as planned. 2  The statutory validity of bonds for relief
of the destitute was similarly determined in a recent Michigan
case.1
9 3
It will be recalled that in Fidelity Nat. Bank v. Swope I"' the
United States Supreme Court sustained the propriety of an action
brought by the city for a declaration of the validity of a special
assessment for public improvements and of the bonds issued there-
under. Bond validating statutes in California, Florida, Georgia,
and Mississippi have long been sustained.
Public authorities have sought by declaration the aid of a judi-
cial determination of validity in support of other powers in ad-
vance of their exercise. For example, the liability of a railroad to
tax assessments by the plaintiff city for street improvements on
land which the railroad had dedicated to the city and on which
191 City of Chester v. Woodward, 13 D. & C. 201, 203 (Pa. 1929).
192 City of Sturgis v. Christenson Bros. Co., 235 Ky. 346, 31 S. W.(2d) 386
(1930).
3.93 City of Muskegon Heights v. Danigelis, 235 N. W. 83 (Mich. 1931).
194 274 U. S. 123, 131 (1927).
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it claimed future tax exemption 95 was determined by declaration,
because the contractor had refused to proceed with the improve-
ments until the city's power to levy the assessment had been made
clear. The doubts of the city and the fears of the contractor were
thus dissipated. In an English case, a municipality claimed a dec-
laration that a certain sewer did not require the defendant board's
approval and that the plaintiff was privileged to proceed without
it.' 0 Cities or administrative boards have sought declarations of
their power to sell defendant's land for taxes, 9' to take certain
land originally native, without compensation,'98 to purchase land,
to erect stores and to mortgage,' to construct and lease tram-
ways,"' to transfer a teacher to a different position with the same
salary,"0' to detain a ship until certain charges were paid," 2 to per-
mit the defendant corporation to amend its articles of incorpora-
tion by issuing no-par stock and using the proceeds in certain
ways.
20 3
This review of the variety of doubts, dilemmas, and uncertain-
ties which the procedure for a declaratory judgment has dissipated
and removed will have indicated the social service performed by
that method of raising issues. Private and public business with
its ever growing complexity needs and should receive the aid of
the courts in the construction of contested rights before violence
and irretrievable loss have occurred. If this requires closer ex-
amination of the theory of causes of action, justiciability, and
judgments, it is a task which should be welcomed. It has at its




'95 Chesapeake & Ohio R. R. v. City of Morehead, 223 Ky. 698, 4 S. W.(2d)
726 (1928).
196 London County Council v. Port of London Authority, [1914] 2 Ch. 362.
197 Devonport Borough Council v. Quarterly, [193o] N. Z. 884.
198 Smith v. Attorney-General, 31 N. Z. 509 (1912); Solicitor-General v. Cave
et al., 31 N. Z. 614 (1912).
199 New Zealand Meat Producers Board v. Attorney General, [i927] N. Z. 85I.
200 Mayor of Miramar v. The King, 28 N. Z. 727 (I9g9).
201 Wanganui Education Board v. Bowater et al., [x916] N. Z. 59o.
202 The Countess, [1923] P. 279, [X922] P. 4I; cf. Ford Shipping Line, Ltd.
v. Superintendent of Mercantile Marine, 29 N. Z. 679 (1910).
203 Lewis v. Oscar C. Wright Co., 234 Ky. 814, 29 S. W.(2d) 566 (1930).
